




The Dissertation Committee for Andrew Jesse Mills
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:








Lower Bounds and Correctness Results for Locally
Decodable Codes
by
Andrew Jesse Mills, B.S.
DISSERTATION
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
August 2011
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my family, friends, and advisor. With regards to
technical matters, I am especially appreciative of discussions with Mahdi Cher-
aghchi, William Gasarch, Rahul Jain, Jaikumar Radhakrishnan, and David
Woodruff.
iv
Lower Bounds and Correctness Results for Locally
Decodable Codes
Publication No.
Andrew Jesse Mills, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2011
Supervisor: Anna Gál
We study fundamental properties of Locally Decodable Codes (LDCs).
LDCs are motivated by the intuition that traditional codes do not have a
good tradeoff between resistance to arbitrary error and probe complexity. For
example, if you apply a traditional code on a database, the resulting codeword
can be resistant to error even if a constant fraction of it was corrupted; however,
to accomplish this, the decoding procedure would typically have to analyze
the entire codeword. For large data sizes, this is considered computationally
expensive. This may be necessary even if you are only trying to recover a single
bit of the database! This motivates the concept of LDCs, which encode data
in such a way that up to a constant fraction of the result could be corrupted;
while the decoding procedures only need to read a sublinear, ideally constant,
number of codeword bits to retrieve any bit of the input with high probability.
Our most exciting contribution is an exponential lower bound on the
length of three query LDCs (binary or linear) with high correctness. This is
v
the first strong length lower bound for any kind of LDC allowing more than
two queries. For LDCs allowing three or more queries, the previous best lower
bound, given by Woodruff, is below Ω(n2). Currently, the best upper bound
is sub-exponential, but still very large. If polynomial length constructions
exist, LDCs might be useful in practice. If polynomial length constructions do
not exist, LDCs are much less likely to find adoption – the resources required
to implement them for large database sizes would be prohibitive. We prove
that in order to achieve just slightly higher correctness than the current best
constructions, three query LDCs (binary or linear) require exponential size.
We also prove several impossibility results for LDCs. It has been ob-
served that for an LDC that withstands up to a δ fraction of error, the proba-
bility of correctness cannot be arbitrarily close to 1. However, we are the first
to estimate the largest correctness probability obtainable for a given δ. We
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Locally decodable codes (LDCs) are very interesting combinatorial struc-
tures, both in their own right and in the other structures that can be de-
rived from them. They have many applications, including some in theoretical
work and some in practical, “real world” work. Informally (from [42]), a
(q, δ, ε)-LDC is a mapping of strings C: Σn → Γm such that, given the string
C(x1x2...xn) corrupted in at most δm positions, each xi (i ∈ [n]) can be re-
covered with probability at least 1|Σ| + ε by examining at most q positions of
that string. This thesis, because of the motivations given shortly, focuses on
proving fundamental properties of LDCs with q ≥ 2.
1.1 Applications
LDCs were first introduced by Katz and Trevisan [32]. [32] considered
the application of encoding a huge amount of data in such a way that up
to a constant fraction of the result could be arbitrarily corrupted; however,
the decoding procedure would only have to read a sublinear, ideally constant,
number of codeword bits to retrieve any bit of the input with high probability.
The intuition behind this is that traditional codes do not have a good tradeoff
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between resistance to arbitrary error and probe complexity. For example, if
you apply a traditional code on an entire database, the resulting codeword can
be resistant to error even if a constant fraction of it was corrupted; however,
the decoding procedure would typically have to analyze the entire codeword.
For large data sizes, this is considered computationally expensive. This may
be necessary even if you are only trying to recover a single bit!
The typical process people use is to subdivide their input into sublinear
portions, use what is called a ”good” code (meaning the encoding is only a
constant times larger than the input and the encoding is resistant to a constant
fraction of it being corrupted) on each portion, and concatenate the results.
But consider what happens. For this codeword, if an adversary were allowed
to corrupt just a constant fraction of the codeword, permanent loss of some
of the input data could result. This is because the adversary could arbitrarily
change one of those sublinear portions and force an error when a decoder tries
to retrieve the input bits corresponding to that portion.
LDCs provide the ultimate solution, in some sense. If you know the
error probability in advance, you can choose an LDC with the appropriate
parameters and protect all your data with very high confidence. We remark
that the only type of error LDCs are not resistant against is one that adapts
interactively to the decisions of the recovery algorithm – and it is hard to
imagine any decoder resistant to that. Moreover, even if you do not know
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the error probability in advance, LDCs typically provide graceful degradation
in probability of successful recovery for increasing corruption up to a certain
limit. If you are able to estimate the amount of corruption present in a data
string, you can repeat the recovery algorithm several times to boost the recov-
ery success probability to whatever level you desire.
Katz and Trevisan [32] shows a close correspondence between LDCs and
private information retrieval (PIR) schemes, which were introduced in Chor
et al. [13]. PIRs are another very practical application. A PIR is a protocol
that allows a user to retrieve a bit i of a size n database without the database
learning anything at all about i. We will define this formally later on. [13]
proved that this requires Ω(n) communication if the database is one server
with unlimited computational power. More interestingly, [13] relaxed the PIR
problem to allow the database to be many servers which are forbidden from
communicating with one another, and showed that this set up allows for PIR
protocols with o(n) communication. This gives hope that PIRs could be used
in real life, where database sizes can be huge. Examples of particularly useful
situations for PIRs include medical and financial databases. In the former,
users, who naturally are more likely to query for information on afflictions
they have, can get they information they want, while potential eavesdroppers
and hackers, who know that users are more likely to query for information
on afflictions they have, are unable to figure out what users are querying for,
and so are unable to speculate what, if any, affliction a user might have. The
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financial case is analogous. Users, who naturally are more likely to query for
information of securities they want to buy or sell, can get the information
they want, while potential eavesdroppers and hackers, who know that users
are more likely to query for information on securities they want to buy or sell,
are unable to figure out what users are querying for, and so are unable to
speculate what, if any, security a user might want to buy or sell.
Locally testable codes (LTCs) have a related definition to LDCs. In-
formally, a q-LTC is a injective mapping of strings C: Σn → Γm such that, for
any small enough δ > 0, there exists a testing algorithm which outputs ”true”
when given a string that is an image of C and which outputs ”false” at least
half the time when given a string that is at least δm Hamming distance from
any image of C. Additionally, the algorithm may only examine q of the m
positions of the codeword (randomly chosen) in order to decide, and the map
C, when viewed as a code, must have Ω(m) minimum distance.
In the theoretical world, LTCs are valuable in probabilistically check-
able proof constructions (for example Goldreich and Sudan [25]). In the prac-
tical world, as the definition suggests, using an LTC will allow the receiver of
a possibly corrupted data string to quickly check if that data string is close
enough to a correct code word. A quick check that returns negative can allow
the decoder to save energy by forgoing running a more computationally inten-
sive traditional decoding algorithm.
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Self-correcting codes (SCC) also have a related definition to LDCs. In-
formally, a q-SCC is a subset of Γm such that, for a given i ∈ [m] and δ > 0,
there exists an algorithm which outputs the i’th position of the uncorrupted
codeword with high probability, even when any set of at most δm positions
have been corrupted. Furthermore, the algorithm may only examine q of the
m positions of the codeword (randomly chosen) in order to decide.
Gertner et al. [23] defines a Symmetric PIR scheme (SPIR) as a PIR
scheme which does not information-theoretically leak any data to the user be-
yond that which he asked for. This may be useful in situations where users
have to pay for each access they make to a server. Kalai and Raz [31] uses
SPIR to construct small sized non-interactive zero-knowledge proof schemes.
A synonym for an n bit database SPIR scheme used in the literature is
a ”1-n oblivious transfer scheme.” This concept was introduced in Even et al.
[19]. There is no difference between these two concepts; however, researchers
using the latter terminology are usually less interested in the problem of find-
ing the information-theoretic communication complexity for large n. There are
many interesting results related to this regarding functions that can computed
from several users’ inputs, such that those users remain oblivious to certain
features of other users’ inputs.
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Dvir and Shpilka [17] shows a correspondence of LDCs to polynomial
identity testing. It relates any depth 3 arithmetic circuit (ΣΠΣ circuit) that
computes the zero polynomial to an LDC, and uses a lower bound on the
length of LDCs to upper bound the rank of the original circuit.
LDCs have also been used to consider worst case to average case reduc-
tion (see Trevisan [43] for an introduction).
Lu et al. [36] uses a variant of LDCs to construct mergers requiring
only a small amount of truly random bits to function. With other tricks, this
allows them to construct extractors with some of the best known tradeoffs in
parameters.
Gasarch [22], Trevisan [43], and Kerenidis and de Wolf [34] detail many
other concepts that have similar definitions to LDCs and PIRs. Computation-
ally private information retrieval schemes (CPIR) are PIR schemes that involve
an assumption of intractability of some problem. While mathematically they
are weaker in the sense that their operation depends on unproven assumptions,
they are significantly more efficient in terms of communication and computa-
tion than known information theoretic PIR schemes. So they may be more
likely to be adopted for use in real life.
6
1.2 The Central Mystery
Katz and Trevisan [32] showed, using an information-theoretic argu-
ment, that one query LDCs are essentially impossible. Wehner and de Wolf
[44] have the best known lower bound for two query LDCs – it is 2Ω(n), where
n is the input size. The best known upper bound for two query LDCs comes
from Woodruff [46] and is 2O(n). So the known lower and upper bounds for
two query LDCs are very close. But the situation is dramatically different for
LDCs allowing up to three or more queries! The best lower bound, given by
Woodruff [45] is not even larger than Ω(n2). On the other hand, Efremenko
[18] gives a construction of size 22
√
logn log logn
. This was slightly improved by [46]
in certain parameter ranges. This dramatic gap has persisted for many years,
despite the steadily increasing body of literature on LDCs. From a real world
perspective, it is crucial to know whether there exist LDCs with a constant
query number that have size polynomial in n. If this is true, then LDCs and
PIRs are likely to be useful in practice. If this is not true, LDCs and PIRs are
much less likely to find adoption – the resources required to implement them
for large database sizes would be prohibitive.
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Chapter 2
General Facts about LDCs
We start with the definition of Locally Decodable Codes, which was
given first by Katz and Trevisan in [32]. Our presentation of the definition is
based on [32] and Goldreich et al. [24].
Definition 2.1 ([32]. See also [24].) For reals δ and ε, and a natural number
q, we say that C: Σn → Γm is a (q, δ, ε)-LOCALLY DECODABLE CODE
(LDC) if there exists a probabilistic oracle machine A such that:
• In every invocation, A makes at most q queries (possibly adaptively).
Query j ∈ [m] to the oracle y ∈ Γm is answered by yj. (Think of y as
the potentially corrupted codeword that A is examining.)
• For every x ∈ Σn and y ∈ Γm with d(y,C(x)) ≤ δm, and for every
i ∈ [n], we have Pr[Ay(i) = xi] ≥ 1|Σ| + ε, where the probability is taken
over the internal coin tosses of A.
A is called the DECODING ALGORITHM or DECODER.
When we study decoding algorithms specifically, sometimes we use the
following terminology:
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Definition 2.2 A probabilistic oracle machine A is said to ACHIEVE (q, δ, ε)
on an LDC C if
• In every invocation, A makes at most q queries (possibly adaptively).
Query j ∈ [m] to the oracle y ∈ Γm is answered by yj. (Think of y as
the potentially corrupted codeword that A is examining.)
• For every x ∈ Σn and y ∈ Γm with d(y,C(x)) ≤ δm, and for every
i ∈ [n], we have Pr[Ay(i) = xi] ≥ 1|Σ| + ε, where the probability is taken
over the internal coin tosses of A.
It is obvious that the following must be true for LDCs to be interesting:
|Σ| > 1, |Γ| > 1, 0 < δ ≤ 1, and 0 < ε < 1− 1|Σ| . For the last parameter range,
if instead, ε = 0, here is what would happen:
Fact 2.1 Any code, for any q ≥ 0 and any 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, is a (q, δ, 0)-LDC.
Proof: The recovery algorithm can ignore the output of the code and guess
a member of Σ uniformly at random.











(where the probability is over the algorithm’s internal randomness) as the al-
gorithm’s CORRECTNESS.
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Defining the correctness is convenient especially if one is studying a
restricted class of algorithms, some of which have a correctness less than 1|Σ| .
In this case, correctness may be a more intuitive quantity than ε.
Here we introduce a common restriction on the capability of recovery
algorithms.
Definition 2.4 Consider a recovery algorithm A operating on an LDC. A
is called NON-ADAPTIVE if A chooses which codeword positions to query
without knowledge of the values of any of those positions.
Very few papers in the literature analyze LDCs that can possibly be
adaptive. There are two known reductions from adaptive to non-adaptive
codes – they are both in Katz and Trevisan [32]. The first only changes q
but leaves δ and ε the same. The second only changes ε, but leaves q and
δ the same. The only other paper dealing with possibly adaptive codes is
Deshpande et al. [15], which proves a lower bound very similar to [32] for
them. Not surprisingly, the proof techniques in [15] are substantially more
complicated. In this document, we only study non-adaptive algorithms. This
motivates the following definition:
Definition 2.5 Consider a non-adaptive recovery algorithm A operating on
an LDC. Assume A has been tasked to return the i’th (i ∈ [n]) input bit of
the code. Then without loss of generality, A can flip all of its internal random
10
coins before doing any other operation. For some specific value of internal
randomness, define the QUERY SET as the values j ∈ [m] representing the
codeword positions A has chosen to query.
Clearly if, for a given i and a given value of internal randomness, the
size of the query set is less than q, we could add additional vertices to the
query set so that it has size exactly q – the algorithm can just ignore the
results of the extra queries. In general, when we refer to a q query algorithm,
that algorithm is allowed to query less than q queries sometimes. But when
we say an EXACTLY q query algorithm, we mean an algorithm that always
queries and uses exactly q positions.
Definition 2.6 A code C: Σn → Γm is called BINARY if |Σ| = |Γ| = 2.
It is often simpler to prove results for binary codes than for more general
codes, so some of our results will hold for binary codes only.
Definition 2.7 Take a field F . A function C: F n → Fm is called a LINEAR
MAPPING if, for all a, b ∈ F n, C(a) + C(b) = C(a+ b).
The following definition is closely related.
Definition 2.8 Take a field F . A linear subspace of Fm is a called a LINEAR
CODE.
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Linear codes are widely studied by researchers because they often have
nice combinatorial structure. They are also used widely in practical imple-
mentations because encoding is simple.
For a linear code, it is convenient to represent the function that de-
termines a given codeword position by a vector: for a given j ∈ [m], define
aj ∈ F n as the aj satisfying ∀x ∈ F n, Cj(x) = aj · x.
Here is notation we will use for analyzing linear codes:
Definition 2.9 Let ei denote the i’th unit vector with length n.
For a given edge Q, we use the notation span(Q) to represent the linear
span of the vectors in Q.
We make extensive use of probability expressions in this thesis. To
make notation compact when conditioning on long expressions, for two events
A and B, A;B will denote the event A ∩B.
Here is a simple observation that we will occasionally use:
Claim 2.2 Let C be a (q, δ, ε)-LDC of length m. Then there also exists an
(q, δ, ε)-LDC with no codeword position that is identically a constant value and
which has length at most m.
12


























Now let us construct a new algorithm A′ that is the same as A except
for the following. Whenever A would have queried a constant position, A′ uses
the known, uncorrupted value, rather than using the results of the query. For













Now construct a code C’ that is C excluding the constant positions.
























+ ε because m′ ≤ m
Thus, C’ is a (q, δ, ε)-LDC.
2.1 Smooth Codes
In this section, we discuss smooth codes, which have great similarity to
LDCs. We start by defining what a smooth code is. The definition was given
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first by Katz and Trevisan in [32]. Our presentation of the definition is based
on [32] and Goldreich et al. [24].
Definition 2.10 ([32]. See also [24].) For a natural number q and positive
reals c and ε, we say that C: Σn → Γm is a (q, c, ε)-SMOOTH CODE if there
exists a probabilistic algorithm A such that:
• In every invocation, A reads at most q positions of C(x).
• For every i ∈ [n] and x ∈ Σn, we have Pr[AC(x)(i) = xi] ≥ 1|Σ| + ε.
• For every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], the probability that on input i, A queries
index j is at most c
m
.
The probabilities are taken over the internal coin tosses of A. Just as for
LDCs, A is called the DECODING ALGORITHM.
[32] gives reductions of smooth codes to and from LDCs:
Lemma 2.1.1 ([32].) A (q, c, ε)-smooth code is also a (q, δ, ε− cδ)-LDC.
Lemma 2.1.2 ([32].) A (q, δ, ε)-LDC is also a (q, q
δ
, ε)-smooth code.
As in the case of LDCs, A is called non-adaptive when A’s choice of
what to query does not depend on its previous queries. The correctness of a
smooth code algorithm is defined just the same as the correctness of an LDC
14
algorithm.
Related to smooth codes are smooth decoders of codes. We will now
analyze some comments given by Katz and Trevisan [32] [43] regarding LDCs
whose recovery algorithms are restricted to ”smoothly” distribute their queries
across the codeword positions:
Definition 2.11 ([43]. See also [32].) Let C: Σn → Γm be a code. Assume
there exists a probabilistic algorithm A such that:
• For every i ∈ [n] and x ∈ Σn, we have Pr[AC(x)(i) = xi] ≥ 1|Σ| + ε.
• For every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], the probability that on input i, A queries
index j is at most c
m
.
The probabilities are taken over the internal coin tosses of A. Then we call A
a (c, ε)-SMOOTH DECODER.
If, in addition, for every i ∈ [n] and j1, j2 ∈ [m], the probabilities that
on input i, A queries index j1 or j2 are exactly the same, then A is called a
PERFECTLY SMOOTH DECODER.
Note that given a length m code, any decoding algorithm is an (m, ε)-
smooth decoder for some ε. Also, any local decoding algorithm that always
probes exactly q queries cannot be a (c, ε)-smooth decoder for c < q. Other-
wise, the sum of the probabilities of querying each codeword position would be
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less than q, contradicting the assumption that the decoder always probes ex-
actly q positions. By similar logic, a (q, ε)-smooth decoder that always probes
exactly q queries is a perfectly smooth decoder. No codeword position can be
queried with probability less than q
m
because otherwise, the sum of the proba-
bilities of querying each codeword position would be less than q, contradicting
the assumption that the decoder always probes exactly q positions. So all
positions are queried with the same probability: q
m
.
With the definition of smooth decoder in hand, we can prove:
Claim 2.1.3 ([32]. See also [43].) Let C: Σn → Γm be a code. Assume that
an algorithm A is a (c, ε)-smooth decoder for C. Then ζδ(A) ≥ 1|Σ| + ε− cδ.
Proof: Fix i ∈ [n] as the input position the algorithm is tasked to recover.
Let y be C(x) corrupted in at most δm positions by the adversary. The
probability that any one of the δm corrupted positions is queried by Ay(i) is
at most c
m
. By the union bound, the probability of the algorithm querying
any of the corrupted positions is at most c
m
δm = cδ. Also, by assumption, the
algorithm is wrong with probability at most 1− 1|Σ|−ε when operating on C(x)
uncorrupted. So, using another union bound, the probability the algorithm is
wrong on y is at most 1− 1|Σ| − ε+ cδ.
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2.2 Overview of Previous Results
In this section, we give a broad overview of the results people have
proven for different parameter ranges of LDCs. In the sections that follow, we
will delve into detail about how the results fit into the context of history.
Katz and Trevisan [32] proved, using an information-theoretic argu-
ment, that for q = 1, ε > 0, and large enough n, LDCs do not exist. Wehner
and de Wolf [44] have the best lower bound for q = 2 LDCs: assuming |Σ| =




bound and all of the lower bounds below assume ε > 0.) If we can assume that
the recovery procedure uses only b bits from each codeword position it queries,






. If we can assume the LDC is bi-
nary and linear, Shiowattana and Lokam [42] prove a lower bound of Ω(2
4δn
1−2ε ),
and that is tight within a constant factor. The best known binary, q = 2 LDC
is the Trevisan construction, detailed by Obata [38]. It has size O(2
4δn
1−2ε ). It
exists for any tradeoff of δ and ε so long as ε ≤ 1
2
− 2δ. Actually, Woodruff
[46] provides a transformation that for small enough ε and δ makes the Tre-
visan construction even shorter. This transformation is interesting because
it makes the code non-linear, in contrast to almost all other constructions in
the literature which are linear. The size becomes 2O(max(δ,ε)δn). So the known
upper and lower bounds for q = 2, binary LDCs are very close, and, under the
assumption of linearity, even closer. But the situation is dramatically different






If we can assume the LDC is linear and q = 3, Woodruff again in [47] proves
the best lower bound of Ω(n2). The best upper bound for q ≥ 3, given by Efre-




. This construction has a non-binary version
with correctness 1−3δ and a binary version with correctness 1−6δ. For small
enough ε and δ, LDCs can be improved slightly by a black box transformation
mentioned in [46]. Also, there is another transformation in [46] that converts
the binary Efremenko code into one with correctness 1−3δ−α, for any α > 0,
at the expense of blowing up the code’s length.
Two thorough surveys of LDCs are Yekhanin [50] and Hielscher [26].
2.3 Previous LDC Impossibility Results
Katz and Trevisan [32] showed, using an information-theoretic argu-
ment, that for q = 1, ε > 0, and large enough n, LDCs do not exist. For q
= 2 LDCs, the existence of the Hadamard code rules out a general impossi-
bility result, but we ask the question of what is the allowed tradeoff between
ε and δ. We will prove later that when q = 2, linear LDCs can only exist for






2.4 Previous LDC Lower Bounds Results
After Katz and Trevisan [32] but before Kerenidis and de Wolf [34],
the huge gap between known upper and lower bounds started at q = 2. To
try to bridge that gap, a series of papers beginning with Goldreich et al. [24],
followed by Obata [38], and continuing most recently with Shiowattana and
Lokam [42], and Dvir and Shpilka [17] considered only linear, q = 2 LDCs.
[24] proved that, for large enough n, binary, linear, q = 2 LDCs must have size
at least 2εδn/4. (This lower bound and all of the lower bounds below assume
ε > 0.) They also proved that linear, q = 2 LDCs over a finite field F must
have size at least 2
εδn/8
4|F | . [38] improved the exponent: he showed that, for large





improved this further: they showed that binary, linear, q = 2 LDCs must have
size at least 2
4δ
1−2εn−1. This is very impressive as it is within a constant factor
of the best known upper bound of this type of code, the Trevisan construction.
[17] improved the lower bound for non-binary codes: they showed that linear,
q = 2 LDCs over any (possibly infinite) field must have size at least 2(εδn/4)−1.
The result of Kerenidis and de Wolf [34] was shocking because it proved
strong lower bounds on the size of possibly non-linear LDCs using quantum
proof techniques, even though LDCs seemingly have nothing to do with quan-
tum computing. Specifically, [34] proved that q = 2 LDCs with Σ = {0, 1}
and Γ = {0, 1}l must have size at least 2H(1/2+δε/23l+1)n−l. Wehner and de
Wolf [44] improve this slightly: they show that q = 2 LDCs with Σ = {0, 1}
19
and Γ = {0, 1}l whose recovery algorithms only use b bits of the l they get
in each query, must have size at least 2Θ(δε








Many people, including Jain [30] and Samorodnitsky [41], had asked whether
quantum techniques are essential or if they are just an artifact of how the
proof was discovered. [30] proves a result for smooth codes instead of LDCs,
but because there exist reductions of smooth codes to and from LDCs [32],
that is considered very relevant. [30] shows that binary, q = 2 smooth codes
with 1
2
+ ε ≥ 1 − c2
8n2
must have size at least 2
n
320c2
−1. [30]’s proof does not
use quantum techniques but has a much worse bound that holds for a much
narrower range of parameters. [41] wrote many of the quantum steps of [44]
in non-quantum mathematics. Ben-Aroya et al. [8] finally proved an exponen-
tial lower bound on the size of two query, binary, possibly non-linear LDCs
without the use of quantum techniques. They used a deep mathematical in-
equality that they showed had many other applications. [34] shows how an
LDC reduction credited to Trevisan can transform binary LDC lower bounds
into lower bounds on codes with somewhat higher output alphabet size. This
can be used on both [34]’s and [8]’s lower bounds. However, a non-trivial lower
bound on the size of two query, possibly non-linear LDCs over larger fields is
not known, except when the input alphabet is binary and the output alphabet
size is less than O(
√
n).
Despite the small gap between upper and lower bounds for q = 2,
there is still a big gap for q ≥ 3. The first lower bound on q ≥ 3 LDCs
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q−1 ). Deshpande et al. [15] prove the same lower bound even
when the LDC’s recovery algorithm may be adaptive. Not surprisingly, con-
sidering adaptive algorithms makes their proof much more complicated. [44]
improves [32] slightly: they show that binary LDCs must have size at least
Ω(( n
logn
)1+1/(dq/2e−1)). The bound was improved slightly more by Woodruff [45]:





He later proved [47] that linear, three query LDCs over any (possibly infinite)
field, must have size at least Ω(n2). It is important to note that the q ≥ 3 re-
sults of both [44] and [45] are fundamentally based on the same combinatorial
theorem of [32]. The combinatorial part of [15] is similar to that of [32] as well.
(As a footnote to the above discussion on quantum techniques in an-
alyzing LDCs, Briet and de Wolf [11] studied a different object they called
Locally Decodable Quantum Codes (LDQC). An LDQC is defined as a map-
ping Σn to m qubits such that, for each i ∈ [n], the symbol xi can be recovered
with probability at least 1|Σ| + ε by making only q quantum queries, even if
δm qubits of the codeword have been corrupted. [11] concluded ”that q-query
quantum codes are not significantly better than q-query classical codes, at least
for constant or small q.” Thus, more research has been focussed on quantum
techniques in analyzing LDCs rather than on quantum analogs of LDCs.)
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2.5 Previous LDC Constructions
The prototypical LDC construction is the Hadamard code. This is an
old construction, but it was first studied in a similar way to LDCs by Blum
et al. [10]. The length of this code is 2n. Many constructions of LDCs
were PIR constructions that were adapted into LDCs. These will be dis-
cussed in the next section. Trevisan gave the first length improvement on
the Hadamard code that did not originally come from studying PIR. His con-
struction has length O(2
4δn
1−2ε ). Woodruff [46] made a general transformation
that, for small enough δ and ε, converts this linear code into a non-linear code
of size 2O(max(δ,ε)δn). Interestingly, this code is smaller than the best lower
bound for linear q = 2 codes. For q ≥ 3, the best known construction, given




. This builds on a series of papers orig-
inating from the breakthrough result of Yekhanin [49]. All of these LDCs
have parameters 1
2
+ ε = 1 − 6δ. [49]’s construction of length O(exp(n10−7))
was significantly smaller than the previous record holder, Beimel et al. [6]
and its bound of exp(exp(O( logn log
(2) q
q log q
))). [49] was also unique because it
showed, if one could assume a widely believed assumption about Mersenne
primes (specifically, that there are infinitely many of them), a construction of
length O(exp(nO(1/ log logn))) was possible. Raghavendra [39] simplified [49]’s
argument. Kedlaya and Yekhanin [33] slightly relaxed the assumption needed
to create these short codes. They only required the existence of an infinite
number of Mersenne numbers with large prime factors. In any event, [18] su-
persedes all of the preceding results, because it has smaller length, and it does
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not use any unproven assumptions. As stated earlier, there are two trans-
formations given by Woodruff [46] that can operate on the binary Efremenko
code: one converts the code into one with correctness 1−3δ−α, for any α > 0,
at the expense of blowing up the code’s length. The other, for small enough ε
and δ, reduces the length of the code slightly.
For larger numbers of queries, the above results achieve correctness that
decreases with increasing q, of the form 1−qδ, and thus they can tolerate only
small δ for large q. In fact, our results will show that with the type of decoders
they use, they cannot possibly do better. Dvir et al. [16] achieve better depen-
dence of the correctness on the corruption as q increases, and provide binary
constructions that can tolerate close to 1/8 fraction of corruption for large
numbers of queries. Ben-Aroya et al. [7] give a sub-exponential size construc-
tion that tolerates up to 1
2
−α fraction of corruption, however the field size and
number of queries blow up as α decreases to 0. Babai et al. [2] give a construc-
tion of size n1+α, for any α > 0, which requires a poly-logarithmic number of
queries. If nα queries are allowed, then Kopparty et al. [35] show that the
rate of the LDC can be arbitrarily close to 1. We will see that a significant
innovation of these papers is that the decoding algorithms presented in them
use non-linear operations to enhance their tolerance to codeword corruption.
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2.6 Previous PIR Results
Katz and Trevisan [32] prove reductions of LDCs to and from smooth
codes and reductions of smooth codes to and from PIRs. So the study of LDCs
and PIRs are intertwined. We start with the formal definition of PIR:
Definition 2.12 (Chor et al. [13].) A one-round, k-server PRIVATE IN-
FORMATION RETRIEVAL (PIR) scheme for a database of length n consists
of:
• k query functions: Q1, ..., Qk : [n]× {0, 1}lr → {0, 1}lq
• k answer functions: A1, ..., Ak : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}lq → {0, 1}la
• One reconstruction function: R : [n]× {0, 1}lr × ({0, 1}la)k → {0, 1}
These functions should satisfy:
• Correctness: For every x ∈ {0, 1}n, i ∈ [n], and r ∈ {0, 1}lr ,




• Privacy: For every i, j ∈ [n], s ∈ [k], and q ∈ {0, 1}lq ,
Pr[Qs(i, r) = q] = Pr[Qs(j, r) = q]
where the probabilities are taken over uniformly random r ∈ {0, 1}lr .
1
2
+ ε is the probability of correct retrieval – ε is often required to be 1
2
. lq
is called the query size, and la is called the answer size.
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There are many reasonable extensions of this definition (which we will
not consider). For example, the protocol could utilize more than one round
of user/server communication. Or the privacy constraint could be weakened
from information theoretic security to computational security.
Here are the mentioned reductions of PIRs to and from smooth codes:
Lemma 2.6.1 ([32].) A PIR scheme with k servers, query size lq, answer
size la, and probability of correct retrieval
1
2
+ ε gives a (k, k, ε
2
)-smooth code
C: {0, 1}n → ({0, 1}la)m with m = O(k2lq
ε
).
Lemma 2.6.2 ([32].) A (q, c, ε)-smooth code C: {0, 1}n → Σm gives a PIR







Now we describe some previous results on PIR.
Mann [37] proves that for a k ≥ 2 server PIR scheme operating on a
database of size n bits such that each each server is sent the same number of
bits from the user, the total communication must be at least ( k
2
k−1−α) log n for
any α > 0. This is interesting because for small enough α and large enough n,
it is strictly bigger than the amount of communication required for a user to
retrieve an item from a database without insisting on privacy (i.e. log n+ 1).
Itoh [29] has strong lower bounds, but it assumes the servers represent their
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data in unusual ways that rule out many known constructions. Beigel et al. [3]
proved that any one round, two server PIR scheme in which the servers always
return one bit must have queries of size at least n− 2. This is a strong lower
bound, but they only consider a very restricted class of PIRs. Razborov and
Yekhanin [40] proved a Ω(n1/3) lower bound on the communication complex-
ity of what are called bilinear, one round, two server PIR schemes. Bilinear
schemes, which encompass all known two server PIR schemes except those
coming from a transformation by Woodruff [46], are those in which the user
takes a generalized dot product of the servers’ response vectors in order to
calculate the desired database bit. This is a great result because the bounds
discussed earlier for LDCs do not translate well into this type of PIR – the
best general q = 2 LDC lower bound, coming from Wehner and de Wolf [44],
implies a lower bound of (5− o(1)) log n on the communication complexity of
one round, two server PIR schemes. Additionally, this lower bound matches
the communication complexity of the best known construction for a one round,
two server PIR scheme (see below), which is O(n1/3).
As for upper bounds, Chor et al. [13] show the existence of a two server
PIR scheme with total communication complexity O(n1/3). This was general-
ized by Ambainis [1], who showed the existence of k ≥ 2 server PIR schemes
with total communication complexity O(2k
2
n1/(2k−1)). Itoh [28] improved the
constant in front to get O(k! n1/(2k−1)). Beimel, Ishai, and Kushilevitz [27]
[4] [5] improved that constant further in new constructions to O(k3n1/(2k−1)).
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These papers produced more significant improvements for what is called t-
private PIR, which is when no coalition of t ≤ k servers can determine the
user’s query. (Regular PIR can be considered as 1-private PIR.) Finally,




), beating the O(n1/(2k−1)) roadblock from before. One of
their constructions can be converted into a binary, q query LDC of length
2n
O(log log q/(q log q))
. Woodruff and Yekhanin [48] produced another construction
of size O(k2 log kn1/(2k−1)) that had improvements for k = 2 PIR and t-private
PIR with t > 1. After this, a line of work starting with Yekhanin [49] created
dramatic size reductions for LDC constructions directly instead of PIR con-
structions.
These constructions are families that, for higher k, give k-server PIR
schemes that have smaller and smaller communication complexity. Therefore,
when these PIR schemes are converted into LDCs, they give q query LDCs
that are shorter for higher q.
Chor et al. in [13] give a scheme with k = log n servers and
exp((log k)2 log log k) communication complexity. This is one of the only pa-
pers to address PIRs that allow a higher than constant number of servers.
Gasarch has a survey of PIR [22] that covers similar material to this




In this chapter, we give an overview of the most important results of
this dissertation.
Basic Impossibility Results
We prove several impossibility results for LDCs. An impossibility result
for one query LDCs was given by Katz and Trevisan [32]. They show that one
query LDCs with binary inputs do not exist for any δ and ε, for large enough
input sizes and small enough output alphabet sizes. We generalize this to
any input alphabet. In addition, we prove a few basic impossibility results
that hold without restriction on how many queries the recovery algorithms are
allowed to make. First, we show that if any recovery algorithm, operating on
any binary code, performs better than random guessing, then it must be the
case that δ ≤ 1
2
(Claim 4.1). We extend this to codes over any input alphabet:
if any recovery algorithm, operating on any code, performs better than random
guessing, then it must be the case that δ ≤ 1− 1|Σ| (Claim 4.2). Thus, we prove
there is a range of δ for which no LDC with ε > 0 can exist. Next, we relate
the ability of a recovery algorithm to find the requested input bit better than
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random guessing with the underlying code’s minimum distance. We prove that
the minimum distance for binary codes is at least 2δm+ 1 (Lemma 4.3). This
also implies Claim 4.1. For linear codes, we can extend this to higher input
alphabet sizes: if the input alphabet is the field F , the minimum distance is
|F |
|F |−1δm+ 1 (Lemma 4.4).
Length Lower Bounds
We study how the length of a code influences the correctness of algo-
rithms operating on it. Describing this another way, we show how the existence
of algorithms with very high correctness operating on a specific code implies
something about the length of that code. Our result is the first large length
lower bound for LDCs that are allowed to use more than two queries. Our
main results show that achieving slightly larger than 1 − 3δ correctness for
three query locally decodable codes requires exponential length. Subexponen-
tial length constructions exist for three query LDCs up to 1−3δ correctness for
codes over large, non-constant size fields [18]. No three query, binary LDC of
sub-exponential size has been demonstrated to achieve correctness of 1−3δ or
more (for δ < 1
6
). For binary codes, Woodruff [46] demonstrates three query,
binary, linear LDCs with correctness 1− 3δ − η, where η > 0 is an arbitrarily
small constant, having sub-exponential length. Our lower bound is exp(Ω(n))
and holds for LDCs with correctness at least 1 − 3δ + 6δ2 − 4δ3 + O( 1
n1/3
).
Thus, our lower bound shows that achieving slightly larger correctness than
the currently known subexponential length constructions already requires ex-
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ponential length.
Our results show, surprisingly, that the smallest three query linear
LDCs have significantly different structures in different parameter ranges.
Contrast this with two query linear codes, where there are almost match-
ing lower [42] and upper bounds [38] for the code length (Ω(2
4δ
1−2εn)) that hold
regardless of the LDC’s correctness, as long as ε > 0 is an arbitrary constant.
We have generalized this lower bound to three query, binary codes (The-
orem 6.2.2), to three query, linear codes over arbitrary finite fields (Theorem
6.3.5), and to four query, binary, linear codes (Theorem 7.1). Each of these
proofs uses somewhat different methods. The four query lower bound handles
an interesting case where two bits of a query are the same function of the
input. This is interesting, because one might intuitively believe that having
multiple copies of the same input bit could lead to a better performing LDC
(higher correctness or smaller length for a given corruption level). But the
bound we obtain for four query, binary, linear codes is extremely close to the
bound we obtain for three query, binary, linear codes. Our bound shows that
adding any fourth bit does not seem to help much.
Additionally, we extended our length lower bounds to arbitrary q ≥ 3,
assuming that the recovery algorithm is of one of three commonly used types.
We start by considering linear decoders. A linear decoder is a recovery algo-
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rithm that returns a fixed linear combination of the positions it reads. If a
linear decoder achieves correctness 1 − 3δ(1 − δ)2 − (1 − 1|F |−1)3δ
2(1 − δ) −
(1 − 1|F |−1 +
1
(|F |−1)2 )δ
3 + O( 1
n1/3
) for a binary or linear code with δ fraction
corruption, then the length of the code must be exponential (Theorem 8.1).
Matching sum decoders were formally defined by Woodruff [46]. A q
query matching sum decoder picks a set of size q uniformly at random from a
collection of sets that form a matching in the complete q uniform hypergraph,
whose vertices correspond to the positions of the codeword. Then, the decoder
reads the positions corresponding to the chosen set, and returns the sum of
the positions read. Many known constructions of locally decodable codes have
such decoders. If a matching sum decoder achieves correctness 1−3δ+O( 1
n1/3
)
for a binary or linear code with δ fraction corruption, then the length of the
code must be exponential (Theorem 8.2).
Consider a recovery algorithm operating on a linear code that only
queries query sets that are linearly independent. If, for a given δ fraction
codeword corruption, the recovery algorithm achieves correctness 1|F | + ε, then
the length of the code must be at least exponential in the quantity n(δ +
ε1/3(1− 1|F |)






In the Impossibility Results section, we described results that show that
for certain values of δ, no LDCs with ε > 0 exist at all. Now we consider the
largest ε achievable for a given δ. Goldreich et al. [24] notes the following:
”Note that in a locally decodable code that corrects up to a δ fraction of errors,
the reconstruction probability cannot be arbitrarily close to 1.” However, we
did not find any bounds along these lines in the literature. We believe our
bounds on correctness fill an important gap in the literature.
First, we prove upper bounds on the correctness of recovery algorithms
under restrictions on their behavior. These restrictions we make are very com-
mon in constructions in the literature. We show that any linear decoder has
correctness at most 1− 2δ + |F ||F |−1δ
2 + O( 1√
n
) (Lemma 5.3.3). The concept of
a linear decoder has been implicit since the first paper studying linear LDCs
[24]. We discuss this in more details later. We are also able to prove that the
correctness of a matching sum decoder is no more than 1 − qδ (Claim 5.3.4).
The last special type of algorithms we consider is that which only operates on
linear codes and only queries codeword positions that are linearly independent.




We then advance to proving upper bounds on the correctness of arbi-
trary recovery algorithms, without restrictions. We prove a neat linear algebra
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property that allows us to upper bound the correctness of q query, binary, lin-






) (Theorem 9.2.1). Later
on, we provide a construction (Theorem 12.2) showing that this bound is tight.
Then we generalize the linear algebra property, using a probabilistic method.
This allows us to upper bound the correctness of q query, binary, possibly non-






for large enough n (see
Theorem 9.4.1 for the precise statement). Finally, for any algorithm operating
over a possibly nonlinear code with alphabet Σ, we prove the correctness is









The bounds just discussed are most interesting for large q – and, in
fact, in the binary, linear case, our bound is close to tight in some sense. For
small q, these bounds are not tight. To address this, we also prove precise
bounds on the correctness of recovery algorithms that make no more than
two or three queries. We prove that the correctness of two query recovery





10.1). Note that correctness max(1
2
, 1 − 2δ) is achievable by the Hadamard
code (Lemma 12.1), which is linear. We proceed with an upper bound on the
correctness of three query recovery algorithms working on binary, linear codes,
proving the correctness is at most 1 − 2δ(1 − δ) + O( 1
n
) (Claim 10.2). Claim
10.3 shows that two query decoders working on binary codes have correctness
at most 1− 2δ(1− δ) +O( 1
n1/3
). The methodology of these proofs turned out
to be very helpful in proving our length lower bounds described earlier.
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Locally Decodable Erasure Codes
Locally Decodable Erasure Codes (LDECs) are intimately related to
LDCs. More concretely, LDECs are LDCs but they must tolerate codeword
erasures instead of codeword corruptions. We initiate a study of their prop-
erties by comparing them to LDCs. We also prove several correctness bounds
about them.
Hadamard Codes
The Hadamard code seems to be the prototypical example of an LDC.
Moreover, the Hadamard code may achieve the highest ε for any δ and q. For
this reason, we have precisely analyzed the performance of a good q query







(Theorem 12.2). These results show that the Hadamard code can
indeed achieve close to optimal correctness.
Note
Some of these results appear in Gál and Mills [20] [21]. Our bounds on





In this chapter, we start exploring the limits of correctness of LDC
recovery algorithms operating on codes. These impossibility results show that,
for certain δ, LDCs with correctness better than random guessing do not exist.
The definition of the correctness of a recovery algorithm has a minimum over
all input positions the algorithm could be tasked to recover. When our proofs
are sufficiently general that they work for all input positions, we emphasize
that by considering the following variant of correctness:
Definition 4.1 Let A be an algorithm operating on an LDC C: Σn → Γm.
Define









where the probability is over the algorithm’s internal randomness.
We start by giving bounds that hold for all algorithms, without re-
stricting the number of bits they are allowed to read.
Claim 4.1 Let A be a recovery algorithm for any code C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m.
If δ ≥ 1
2
, then ζ?δ (A) ≤ 12 .
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Proof: Arbitrarily choose i ∈ [n]. Take any a, b ∈ {0, 1}n such that ai 6= bi.
Construct Y ∈ {0, 1}m as being the same as C(a) on the first m
2
positions and
the same as C(b) on the last m
2
positions. Whenever the input to C is a or b,
the adversary will corrupt the codeword to Y by modifying m
2
positions. Either
Pr[AY (i) outputs 1] ≤ 1
2
or Pr[AY (i) outputs 1] ≥ 1
2
, where the probabilities
are over the internal coin tosses of A. In the first case, the algorithm fails
with probability at least 1
2
on whichever input a or b has i’th position 1. In
the second case, the algorithm fails with probability at least 1
2
on whichever
input a or b has i’th position 0. Thus, in either case, we have shown there
exists an input and an adversary error pattern of size at most δm so that the
probability of error is at least 1
2
. So ζδ(A) ≤ 12 .
Now we will generalize to any input alphabet, not just {0, 1}.
Claim 4.2 Let A be a recovery algorithm for any code C: Σn → Σm. If
δ ≥ 1− 1|Σ| , then ζ
?
δ (A) ≤ 1|Σ| .
Proof: Arbitrarily choose i ∈ [n]. For s ∈ Σ, let gs ∈ Σn be vectors such
that (gs)i = s. Split [m] into a partition of |Σ| equal sized subsets named Us
for s ∈ Σ. Construct Y ∈ Σm in the following way. For each s ∈ Σ, let Y be
the same as C(gs) on the positions in Us. Whenever the input to C is one of
the g’s, the adversary will corrupt the codeword to Y by modifying at most
m(1− 1|Σ|) positions. Now∑
s∈Σ
Pr[AY (i) outputs s] = 1
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where the probability is over the internal coin tosses of A. So there
exists at least one s ∈ Σ such that, if the adversary corrupts C(gs) into Y ,
the probability of algorithm correctly answering s is at most 1|Σ| . Therefore,
we have shown there exists an input x and an adversary error pattern of size
at most δm so that the probability of error is at least 1− 1|Σ| . So ζδ(A) ≤
1
|Σ| .
Here are some other observations that hold regardless of the number of
queries an algorithm queries.
Lemma 4.3 Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a (q, δ, ε)-LDC with ε > 0. Then C
has minimum distance at least 2δm+ 1.
Proof: We prove the contrapositive. Assume there are two codewords C(a)
and C(b) with a 6= b ∈ {0, 1}n such that the Hamming distance between them
is less than 2δm+1. Because a 6= b, a and b differ in at least one bit – without
loss of generality, let i ∈ [n] be one such bit in the support of a− b. Because
d(C(a),C(b)) ≤ 2δm, there exists a string, call it Y , such that d(C(a), Y ) ≤
δm and d(Y,C(b)) ≤ δm. Whenever the input to the code is a or b, the
adversary will change the codeword into Y . Either Pr[AY (i) outputs 1] ≤ 1
2
or Pr[AY (i) outputs 1] ≥ 1
2
, where the probabilities are over the internal coin
tosses of A. In the first case, the algorithm fails with probability at least 1
2
on
whichever input a or b has i’th position 1. In the second case, the algorithm
fails with probability at least 1
2
on whichever input a or b has i’th position 0.
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Thus, in either case, we have shown there exists an input and an adversary
error pattern of size at most δm so that the probability of error is at least 1
2
,
which contradicts the assumption that ε > 0.
If we restrict to linear codes, we can generalize Lemma 4.3 to any field.
Note that when we work with codes over a field F , addition and multiplication
operations are performed over F .
Lemma 4.4 Let C: F n → Fm be a linear (q, δ, ε)-LDC with ε > 0. Then C
has minimum distance at least |F ||F |−1δm+ 1.
Proof: We prove the contrapositive. Assume there are two codewords
C(g0) and C(g1) with g0 6= g1 ∈ F n such that the Hamming distance between
them is less than |F ||F |−1δm+ 1. Define the following:
∀f ∈ F, f 6= 0, 1 : gf , g0 + f(g1 − g0)
(Clearly, the notation g0 and g1 for the first two codewords was chosen
for consistency with the definitions of the other gf .)
Because g0 6= g1, g0 and g1 differ in at least one bit – without loss of
generality, let i ∈ [n] be one such bit in the support of g0 − g1. For f ∈ F ,
define hf as the unique gf ′ (f
′ ∈ F ) such (gf ′)i = f .
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Construct a string Y in the following way. In the positions outside the
support of C(g0) − C(g1), let Y equal C(g0). (Notice for later that because
C is linear, the C(gf ) are identical outside of the support of C(g0) −C(g1).)
Divide the positions in the support of C(g0)−C(g1) into |F | equal pieces and
label each piece by a member of F . For the positions in the f ∈ F piece, let
Y be the same as hf . This implies ∀f ∈ F, d(C(hf ), Y ) ≤ |F |−1|F |
|F |
|F |−1δm =
δm. Whenever the input to the code is hf , for some f ∈ F , the adversary will
change the codeword into Y . Now
∑
f∈F
Pr[AY (i) outputs f ] = 1
where the probability is over the internal coin tosses of A. So there
exists at least one f ∈ F such that, if the adversary corrupts C(hf ) into Y ,
the probability of algorithm correctly answering f is at most 1|F | . Therefore,
we have shown there exists an input x and an adversary error pattern of size
at most δm so that the probability of error is at least 1− 1|F | , which contradicts
the assumption that ε > 0.
These results about the minimum distance of an LDC can be used with
common bounds from coding theory. The Plotkin bound implies that a code
with alphabet Σ and minimum distance larger than |Σ|−1|Σ| +α for any constant
α > 0 has at most a constant number of codewords. Therefore, Lemma 4.3
implies that a binary (q, δ, ε)-LDC with ε > 0 must have δ ≤ 1
4
+O(1/n). Sim-
ilarly, Lemma 4.4 implies that a linear (q, δ, ε)-LDC over field F with ε > 0
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must have δ ≤ ( |F |−1|F | )
2 +O(1/n).
We can apply other common bounds from coding theory as well. For
binary codes with ε > 0, Lemma 4.3 and the Hamming bound give:
Lemma 4.5 Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a (q, δ, ε)-LDC with arbitrary q and








Proof: Let d be the minimum distance of the code in question, where,
because of Lemma 4.3, d ≥ 2δm+ 1. Then,
















This implies an upper limit for δ. Alternatively, this also implies a lower
bound on m in terms of δ and n. There is an analogous Hamming bound for
non-binary codes. If we assume linearity, we can use it together with Lemma
4.4 to get similar results.
Now let us consider another well known coding theory bound, the Sin-
gleton bound. For binary codes having ε > 0, Lemma 4.3 and the Singleton
bound give:
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Lemma 4.6 Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a (q, δ, ε)-LDC with arbitrary q and






Proof: The Singleton bound states that the minimum distance of a code is
less than or equal to the length of that code minus the number of information
bits in that code plus one. We have lower bounded the minimum distance of
a binary code having ε > 0 in Lemma 4.3. Thus,
2δm+ 1 ≤ m− n+ 1





For linear codes over field F having ε > 0, Lemma 4.4 and the Singleton
bound give:
Lemma 4.7 Let C: F n → Fm be a linear, (q, δ, ε)-LDC with arbitrary q and
ε > 0. Then





Proof: The Singleton bound states that the minimum distance of a code is
less than or equal to the length of that code minus the number of information
bits in that code plus one. We have lower bounded the minimum distance of
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a linear code having ε > 0 in Lemma 4.4. Thus,
|F |
|F | − 1
δm+ 1 ≤ m− n+ 1





Here is a generalization of Theorem 2 from Katz and Trevisan [32] for
functions over arbitrary alphabets. After proving it, we will see how it yields
a new impossibility result. We also use this theorem in the proof of Claim 5.3.3.
For the proof of the theorem, we will use the following result, which
was originally proved by Robert Fano. Our version is adapted from Cover and
Thomas [14]):
Theorem 4.8 (Robert Fano.) Let X be a random variable in the domain X̃.
For any estimator X̂ of X such that X → Y → X̂ with Pe , Pr(X 6= X̂), we
have
H(Pe) + Pe log |X̃| ≥ H(X | Y )
Note that, as is usual terminology, H represents both the entropy func-
tion on a random variable and the binary entropy function (the meaning being
clear from context).
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Theorem 4.9 Let C: Σn → R be a function. Assume there is an algorithm
A such that:
∀i ∈ [n] : Pr
x




Then log |R| ≥ n
(
log |Σ| −H( 1|Σ| + ε)− (
1
|Σ| + ε) log(|Σ| − 1)
)
.
Proof: Let x be chosen uniformly at random from Σn. Consider the mutual
information between x and C(x):
I(x; C(x)) ≤ H(C(x)) ≤ log |R|
On the other hand,







log |Σ| −H( 1
|Σ|
+ ε)− ( 1
|Σ|
+ ε) log(|Σ| − 1)
)
Fano’s Inequality
Theorem 3 from [32] states that one query LDCs with binary inputs and
small enough output alphabet sizes do not exist when n is large enough. This
can easily be generalized by using Theorem 4.9 here instead of the Theorem 2
in their paper:
Theorem 4.10 Let C: Σn → Γm be a (1, δ, ε)-LDC. Then:
n ≤ log |Γ|
δ
(
log |Σ| −H( 1|Σ| + ε)− (
1
|Σ| + ε) log(|Σ| − 1)
)
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This shows that a one query LDC, no matter what the input alphabet
is, does not exist when the output alphabet size is small enough and n is large




This chapter contains technical tools that are common to many of our
proofs.
5.1 Properties of Query Sets for Linear Codes
In this section, we show that the query sets for linear LDCs that achieve
high enough correctness have certain interesting properties.
The following theorem is very important, because it shows that, if the
algorithm hopes to do better than random guessing, it must query sets that
have a special mathematical property. It was stated just for the two query
case in Lemma 3.2 of Goldreich et al. [24].
Theorem 5.1.1 Consider a linear code C and a q query algorithm A. Let
i ∈ [n] and Q = {j1, j2, ...jq′} ⊂ [m] for q′ ≤ q such that A queries Q with
nonzero probability when tasked to find input position i. Suppose
Pr
xεUFn




where the probability is taken over letting x be uniformly random from
F n and over the internal coin tosses of A. Then there exist cj1 , cj2 , ...cjq′ ∈ F
such that
∑q′
k=1 cjkajk = ei.
Proof: We prove the contrapositive. Take any i and Q = {j1, j2, ...jq′} ⊂
[m] such that there do not exist cj1 , cj2 , ...cjq′ ∈ F for which
∑q′
k=1 cjkajk = ei.
Say yj1 , yj2 , ..., and yjq′ are the respective values A receives from querying Q.
The algorithm’s job when it queries Q is to solve the following system of q′
linear equations for xi:
yj1 = aj1 · x
yj2 = aj2 · x
...
yjq′ = ajq′ · x
Assume without loss of generality that aj1 , aj2 , ... ajq′′ is a maximal col-
lection of linearly independent vectors from aj1 , aj2 , ... ajq′ , for some q
′′ ≤ q′.
(Simply renumber the a’s so this is true.) Therefore, the system of q′ linear
equations above turns into a system of q′′ independent linear equations.
Because the vector ei is not in the span of {aj1 , aj2 , ...ajq′′}, there exists
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an x̂ satisfying:
ei · x̂ = 1
aj1 · x̂ = 0
aj2 · x̂ = 0
...
ajq′′ · x̂ = 0
(Because this is a system of q′′ + 1 independent linear equations, a
solution x̂ must exist.) Note that x̂ 6= 0 because x̂i 6= 0. Using x̂, we define
the following set:
Vx , {x, x+ x̂, x+ 2x̂, ..., x+ (|F | − 1)x̂}
For any x that is a solution of the original q′ equations, every member
of Vx is a solution as well, but each has a different i’th coordinate. Notice
for any x′ /∈ Vx, Vx ∩ Vx′ = ∅. This implies that the number of solutions to
the original q′ equations having i’th coordinate equal d, for any d ∈ F , is the
same. Recall that we are considering uniform x ∈ F n. So,
∀d ∈ F : Pr
xεUFn










This contradicts the assumption from the theorem’s statement that the
probability of correctness is strictly greater than 1|F | .
We will need the following simple fact in many of our correctness and
lower bound proofs.
Fact 5.1.2 Let a1, a2, ... at be vectors from {0, 1}n. Let X be uniformly
random over {0, 1}n. Then a1 ·X, a2 ·X, ... at ·X are t independent, uniformly
random bits if and only if a1, a2, ... at are linearly independent over F2.
Proof: Let us consider what happens when a1, a2, ... at are linearly inde-
pendent over F2. Then, for any set of values d1, d2, ...dt ∈ {0, 1}, the number
of x such that ∀1 ≤ i ≤ t, ai · x = di is always the same: 2n−t. Since the
probability that X = x is the same for any x, a1 · X, a2 · X, ... at · X are t
independent, uniformly random bits.
If a1, a2, ... at are not linearly independent, then there exist c1, c2, ...ct ∈
{0, 1} (not all zero) such that
∑t
k=1 ckak = 0 (where the sum is over F2). This
means that any set of values for a1 ·X, a2 ·X, ... at ·X for which
∑t
k=1 ckak ·X
= 1 will never appear. In particular, if t′ is such that ct′ 6= 0, then the set of
values ∀i 6= t′, ai ·X = 0 and at′ ·X = 1 never appears. Thus, a1 ·X, a2 ·X,
... at ·X cannot be t independent, uniformly random bits.
A small extension of this fact we will use frequently is the following.
If X is uniformly random over {0, 1}n, a1, a2, ... at are linearly independent
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over F2, and b1, b2, ... bt are fixed members of F2, then a1 ·X + b1, a2 ·X + b2,
... at ·X + bt are also t independent, uniformly random bits.
5.2 Probabilistic Adversary
Locally decodable codes have a very strong error model: they must
answer any requested input bit with a high probability when the codeword
has been corrupted by an arbitrary error of a limited size. Because of this,
strong limitations of LDCs, such as for correctness and codeword length, can
be found by considering certain corruption patterns. Most papers studying
LDCs have not taken advantage of this, however, because they immediately
reduce LDCs to smooth codes, which have no corruption model. Two papers
that do not make this reduction and study the error patterns of LDCs are
Obata [38] and Shiowattana and Lokam [42]. Both papers are for LDCs whose
algorithms query at most two positions. These two papers are based on con-
sidering strategies for the adversary to corrupt positions of the codeword.
This section provides several techniques that advance on previous meth-
ods and allow us to create strong adversaries. These adversaries have impor-
tance in defeating algorithms querying more than two positions. To start, here
is an important technical lemma that allows us to simplify many proofs.
Lemma 5.2.1 Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a code. Choose two disjoint sub-
sets R, S ⊆ [m]. Let B1 be chosen from R under an arbitrary probability
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distribution, and let B2 be chosen uniformly at random from all subsets of S.
For convenience, define B , B1 ∪ B2. Let C(x) + B denote the codeword for
x, corrupted in the positions determined by B. Fix i ∈ [n], a natural number








where the probability is over the internal coin tosses of A, uniform x,
and B chosen by the product distribution of the distributions of B1 and B2.
Then there exists a q query LDC recovery algorithm Ã achieving
Pr
x∈Fn,B




as well, and Ã never queries any positions from S.
Proof: Note that R is irrelevant to what is below.
Without loss of generality, say that S = [t] for some 0 ≤ t ≤ m. For
any x ∈ F n and s′1, s′2, ... s′t ∈ {0, 1}, there exists exactly one sequence of s1,
s2, ... st such that
C(x)1 + s1 = s
′
1








Each sequence s1, s2, ... st has the same probability of occurring as the
characteristic vector of B2 (
1
2t
). So any values the algorithm receives from the
positions labeled by members of S are independent, uniformly random values
from {0, 1}. Therefore, we can construct a new algorithm Ã that behaves
exactly as A except, whenever A queries a member of S, Ã samples uniformly
at random from {0, 1} instead. Then over random x and B as above, when
the coin tosses of A and Ã are fixed and equal, the distribution of values A
and Ã receive as answers to their queries are the same. Thus, Ã achieves the
same correctness as A under random x and B.
Now we consider two basic probability distributions. Then we will see
how successful recovery algorithms can be if the adversary is allowed to use
these distributions to corrupt codes.
Definition 5.2.1 Take a ground set [m] for m ≥ 1. The probability distribu-
tion of the random variable B ⊆ [m] is said to be BINOMIAL with probability
δ if each member of [m] is chosen to be part of B independently with probability
δ.
Definition 5.2.2 Take a ground set [m] for m ≥ 1 and an s ≤ m. The
probability distribution of the random variable B ⊆ [m] is said to be FIXED
SIZE with size s if B is chosen uniformly from all subsets of size s from [m].
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These are standard, well studied distributions. We intend to use these
distributions as building blocks to create often times more complex distri-
butions that will decide which positions of an LDC codeword the adversary
corrupts. The first point to be made is that, when analyzing the effect of
an adversary’s actions on the performance of an LDC algorithm, it is usually
more mathematically tractable to assume the adversary uses a derivative of
the first distribution than a derivative of the second. However, in the LDC
model, the adversary is limited to corrupting no more than δ fraction of the
codeword. This can be a problem for derivatives of the first distribution, be-
cause the number of positions chosen in the binomial distribution is not fixed.
Random graph theory, for instance, grapples with the same decision in the
context of choosing edges among pairs of vertices. Results there show that
as m gets large, the binomial and the fixed δm size distributions are asymp-
totically equivalent in many situations. We can take advantage of a similar
asymptotic equivalence.
Let us be more precise. With LDCs, we consider the probability that
q sized subsets (edges) of [m] are corrupted. To that end, consider the prob-
ability that an adversary using the binomial distribution with probability δ





Now consider the probability that an adversary using the fixed δm size
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We provide upper and lower bounds on this second expression in terms
of the first the following two lemmas. The lower bound in particular will be an
essential tool in proving some of our bounds on correctness and lower bounds
on size.












δk(1− δ)q−k − q
2
m






















δm(δm− 1)...(δm− k + 1)(m− δm)(m− δm− 1)...(m− δm− q + k + 1)
m(m− 1)...(m− q + 1)
Let us start by considering just the numerator:
δm(δm− 1)...(δm− k + 1)(m− δm)(m− δm− 1)...(m− δm− q + k + 1)















Note that in the sum above, the mq−j terms have positive coefficients
when j is even and negative coefficients when j is odd. Therefore, for large
enough m, we can bound the numerator by just two terms:





















> δk(1− δ)q−kmq − q
2
2
(δ + 1− δ)δk−1(1− δ)q−k−1mq−1
since k(k − 1) and (q − k − 1)(q − k) are both less than q2
> δk(1− δ)q−kmq − q2mq−1
The denominator, m(m− 1)...(m− q+ 1), is upper bounded by mq, so













δk(1− δ)q−k − q
2
m
The analysis from the 1 ≤ k < q case applies to the k = 0 case as
well, except that the (
∑k−1
i=0 i)δ
k−1(1 − δ)q−k term in (5.1) is not present.




δk(1− δ)q−k − q2
m
is a lower bound for the k = 0 case as well.
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) = δm(δm− 1)...(δm− q + 1)





Here is a technical lemma that will be important in several of our proofs.
It holds for any distribution of the adversary as long as it is independent of
the input.
Definition 5.2.3 We use the notation (C(x) +B)Q to mean the values of the
codeword C(x) corrupted by B on the positions indexed by the query set Q.
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A crucial, but subtle, point used in the proof below is that, for any Q,
the value of (C(x) +B)Q is independent of the event A queries Q.
Lemma 5.2.4 Let C be a code Σn → Σm and A be an LDC recovery algo-
rithm for C. Let x be a uniformly random value from Σn and B be a random
corruption of the codeword C(x). Assume the distributions of x and B are
independent. Finally, let E be an event that does not depend on the internal
randomness of A. Then, for any i ∈ [n], Q ⊂ [m], v ∈ Σ, and any bit string s
(representing the answers to the queries A makes):
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(i) = v | A queries Q;E; (C(x) +B)Q = s] =
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(i) = v | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = s]
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume A flips all of its coin flips in
advance of querying any codeword positions. Let r denote the event that the
outcome of these coin flips is a particular string r. Then we can break apart
the first probability in the equation above:
Pr
x,B




[AC(x)+B(i) = v | A queries Q;E; (C(x) +B)Q = s; r]·
Pr
x,B
[r | A queries Q;E; (C(x) +B)Q = s]
Now Prx,B[A
C(x)+B(i) = v | A queries Q; (C(x)+B)Q = s; r] is either 0
or 1. Therefore, we can remove the conditioning on E from Prx,B[A
C(x)+B(i) =
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v | A queries Q;E; (C(x) +B)Q = s; r] and get:
Pr
x,B






[AC(x)+B(i) = v | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = s; r]·
Pr
x,B
[r | A queries Q;E; (C(x) +B)Q = s]
Let us analyze just the second term of the last expression. For any r,
Pr
x,B
[r | A queries Q;E; (C(x) +B)Q = s]
=
Prx,B[r;A queries Q;E; (C(x) +B)Q = s]
Prx,B[A queries Q;E; (C(x) +B)Q = s]
=
Prx,B[r;A queries Q] Prx,B[E; (C(x) +B)Q = s]




Above, we have used the fact that r and A queries Q is independent of
E and the values of C(x) +B on the positions indexed by Q. By similar logic,
Prx,B[r | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = s] = Prx,B [r;A queries Q]Prx,B [A queries Q] . Therefore,
Pr
x,B






[AC(x)+B(i) = v | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = s; r]·
Pr
x,B
[r | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = s]
= Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(i) = v | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = s]
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5.3 Linear Decoders
We will wish to discuss what linearity means to an LDC. Usually, when
a code is called linear, it means that its positions are each linear combinations
of the input positions. However, in the LDC literature, that concept of linearity
is sometimes confused with the concept of the possible linearity of the decoding
algorithm. To explain more, we present the following definition. It is natural
given earlier work, but we make it explicit:
Definition 5.3.1 Let C be an arbitrary (possibly non-linear) code. We say
that an algorithm A is a LINEAR DECODER for C if, for any fixing of the
outcomes of the coin flips of A, the value it returns is a fixed linear combination
of the codeword positions it reads.
Note that allowed in the definition of linear decoders is the strategy of
ignoring the codeword positions read and just returning the result of a coin
flip. Also note that a non-linear code can have a linear decoder. We will only
consider linear decoders that are non-adaptive.
Many algorithms presented in the literature are linear decoders, so we
prove several results about then. Our first two results will be about linear
decoders that are required to query a certain number of positions. They can
be considered warm-ups to the more general results that follow later.
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We can use Lemma 5.2.2 to quickly prove the following two correctness
bounds.
Claim 5.3.1 Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a binary linear code with n large






δk(1− δ)q−k + q3
n
.
Proof: The adversary chooses a set of δm > q positions uniformly at
random from [m]. The adversary adds 1 to each of these positions. Now let
us analyze the probability of error of the algorithm. Error happens when the
edge the algorithm selects intersects with the adversary’s chosen positions in
k positions, for odd k. For each k, the probability of error is the same for each
edge the algorithm could query. A lower bound for that probability is given
by Lemma 5.2.2. Summing that result for odd k, and using the fact that the
lower bound of Katz and Trevisan [32] implies, for large enough n, m > n, the
result is obtained.
Claim 5.3.2 Let C: F n → Fm be a code with n large enough. For any linear
decoder A using exactly q ≥ 1 positions,












|F | − 1
)i−1)
Proof: The adversary chooses a set of δm positions uniformly at random
from [m]. The adversary corrupts each of these positions to a random value
from F different from what it was uncorrupted. Each random corruption is
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chosen independently. Now let us analyze the probability of error of the al-
gorithm. The probability of error is the same for each edge, so choose some
particular edge.
For a given 1 ≤ k ≤ q, the probability that exactly k of the vertices in





δk(1− δ)q−k − q2
m
. The
lower bound of Katz and Trevisan [32] implies that m > n, for large enough





δk(1− δ)q−k − q2
n
.
We step back to prove a simple induction. Conditioned on the event
that exactly one vertex in the edge is corrupted, the probability that the de-
coding formula returns the wrong answer is 1. Conditioned on the event that
exactly k (for 2 ≤ k ≤ q) vertices of the edge are corrupted, the probability
that the decoding formula returns the wrong answer is z(1− 1|F |−1) + (1− z),
where z is the probability that the decoding formula returns the wrong answer
conditioned on the event that exactly k− 1 vertices of the edge are corrupted.
This implies that, conditioned on the event that exactly k (for 1 ≤ k ≤ q)
vertices of the edge are corrupted, the probability that the decoding formula






Multiplying the probabilities found in paragraphs two and three and
summing over 1 ≤ k ≤ q gives the answer.
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The bound proven in this claim can be approximated as 1− qδ + o(δ).
Now let us prove a related result for more general linear decoders. This
statement is very general in that it works for any number of queries and any
field size.



















Proof: For simplicity, define t , 1
n.25
in the following.















∣∣∣ |Ri| ≥ νm}
for ν ,
log |Σ|
.99n(log |Σ| −H( 1|Σ| + t)− (
1




i∈[n] |Ri|. So there exists a j ∈ [m] belonging to at









= .99n < n. So S̄ contains at least one i.
Without loss of generality, 1 ∈ S̄. That is, |R1| < νm. Consider what happens
when the recovery algorithm is tasked to find x1.
Define γ , |[m]\R1|
m
and β , min( δ−ν
γ
, |Σ|−1|Σ| ). Let A be a q query algo-
rithm for C subjected to δ fraction of the codeword corrupted. Let us con-
sider the probability of error of the decoder over uniformly random x ∈ Σn,
uniformly random B1 ⊂ [m] \ R1 such that |B1| = βγm, uniformly random
B2 ⊆ R1, and the internal randomness of A. (For emphasis, the adversary
chooses B1 to always have the same size; but, for B2, it chooses whether to in-
clude each member of R1 independently.) The adversary replaces each position
in B1 with a value from Σ uniformly at random. It replaces each position in
B2 with a value from Σ uniformly at random, except different from what that
position was uncorrupted. Each random corruption is chosen independently.
For convenience, define B , B1 ∪B2. Note that |B| ≤ δm always. Because of
Lemma 5.2.1, we can, without loss of generality, assume that A never queries
R1.
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When |Σ| ≥ 3,
v ,
log |Σ|
.99n(log |Σ| −H( 1|Σ| + t)− (
1
|Σ| + t) log(|Σ| − 1))
≤ log |Σ|
.99n(log |Σ| − 1− .34 log |Σ|)
n is large enough so t is small enough
≤ 3√
n
for large enough n
If A linearly decodes using 0 positions, its correctness will be 1|Σ| , as
x1 is uniform in Σ. If A linearly decodes using 1 position, then we know its
correctness cannot be more than 1|Σ| + t. Also, applying Claim 5.3.1, we see
the lowest error A can achieve when linear decoding using at least 2 queries is
by linearly decoding using exactly 2 queries. Because of the above, ν ≤ 3√
n
.
Using δ − 3√
n
(which is less than β) in place of δ in the bound of Claim 5.3.1,
and noting that that bound is increasing in δ, the result follows.
A special case of linear decoders is what is called a matching sum
decoder. They were introduced formally in Woodruff [46]:
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Definition 5.3.2 A MATCHING SUM DECODER is an algorithm such that
1) for a given position of the input the algorithm is tasked to find, the algorithm
only queries subsets that form a matching over the codeword positions; and 2)
after choosing a subset to query, the algorithm linearly decodes.
Here is a bound we can state on the correctness of matching sum de-
coders:
Claim 5.3.4 Let C : F n → Fm be a code. If A is a matching sum decoder
operating on C and using exactly q positions, then ζ?δ (A) ≤ 1− qδ.
Proof: Consider an adversary that finds all the (nonintersecting) subsets
of [m] which A queries with nonzero probability. Because each such query set
has size q, there are at most m/q of them. The adversary takes a node cover
of these query sets and, uniformly at random, corrupts δm of them. Thus, the
algorithm errs with probability at least δm
m/q
= qδ.
Summarizing, one of the main points of this section is to show that,
despite how common linear decoder constructions are in the literature, they
have serious limitations on their correctness. In fact, the correctness of a linear
decoder using exactly q+1 positions is worse than our bound on the correctness
of a linear decoder using exactly q positions. This is very strange, because
intuitively, the correctness of a decoder should get better as the algorithm
is allowed the freedom of using more queries. We will show the existence of
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algorithms later that have lower correctness. These algorithms perform non-
linear operations on the values they receive.
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Chapter 6
Length Lower Bounds for Three Query LDCs
In this chapter, we prove that three query LDCs that have high enough
correctness, compared to the amount of corruption the adversary is allowed to
apply, must have exponential size. We prove this first for binary, linear LDCs,
then generalize for all binary LDCs, and then generalize for all linear LDCs.
It is interesting to note that each one of our length lower bounds uses a two
query combinatorial theorem.
6.1 Three Query, Binary, Linear LDCs
We use a classic result about two query codes from Goldreich et al.
[24].
Theorem 6.1.1 ([24].) Let a1, ... am be a sequence of (not necessarily dis-
tinct) elements of {0, 1}n such that for every i ∈ [n] there is a set Mi of






Theorem 6.1.2 Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a linear (q = 3, δ, ε)-LDC with











Note: α > 0 when 1
2





+ ε > µ+ 1− 3δ(1− δ)2 − δ3 + φ(n) for some µ ≥ 0, then Fact 6.1.4
implies 1
2






)3 +φ(n). Therefore, α > µ
4
.
Proof: Claim 2.2 says that, without loss of generality, we can assume C
has no codeword position that is identically zero.
For i ∈ [n], define:
Ri ,
{
j ∈ [m] | C(x)j = xi
}
Also, for each i ∈ [n], let Mi be a largest matching of edges {j1, j2} ⊂
[m] such that C(x)j1 + C(x)j2 = xi. For emphasis, no two edges in Mi can






)1/3 − ν, where
ν , 10
n
. We will see the rationale for the choice of α at the end of the proof.








i ∈ [n] | |Mi| ≥ αm
}
If |S2| ≥ .9n, then we can use Theorem 6.1.1 to conclude m ≥ 22∗.9αn.
If |S2| < .9n, then because we know that |S1| ≤ mνm = .1n, S̄1 ∩ S̄2 contains at
least one i. Without loss of generality, 1 ∈ S̄1 ∩ S̄2. That is, |R1| < νm and
|M1| < αm. Consider what happens when the recovery algorithm is tasked to
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find x1.
We now construct a node cover M̂1 ⊂ [m] of those edges {j1, j2} ⊂ [m]
such that C(x)j1 + C(x)j2 = xi. The graph formed by these edges a union of
complete bipartite subgraphs. In each complete bipartite subgraph, the ver-
tices on one of its sides all correspond to the same vector in {0, 1}n – call it a.
The vertices on the other side all correspond to a+e1. Therefore, to construct
a small node cover, we can take the union of the vertices of the smaller side
of each complete bipartite subgraph. Now, since M1 is a largest matching of
these edges, it has one member for each vertex on the smaller side of each
complete bipartite subgraph, as well. Therefore, |M̂1| = |M1|.
Define γ , |[m]\(R1∪M̂1)|
m




). Let A be a (q, δ, ε)
algorithm for C. Let us consider the probability of error of the decoder over
uniformly random x ∈ {0, 1}n, uniformly random B1 ⊂ [m] \ (R1 ∪ M̂1) such
that |B1| = βγm, uniformly random B2 ⊆ R1 ∪ M̂1, and the internal ran-
domness of A. (For emphasis, the adversary chooses B1 to always have the
same size; but, for B2, it chooses whether to include each member of R1 ∪ M̂1
independently.) For convenience, define B , B1 ∪ B2. Let C(x) + B denote
the codeword for x, corrupted in the positions determined by B. Note that
|B| ≤ δm always. Because of Lemma 5.2.1, we can, without loss of generality,
assume that A never queries R1 ∪ M̂1.
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Now consider the decomposition:
Pr
x,B




[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q] Pr[A queries Q]
Note that probability expressions involving A are also implicitly over
the internal randomness of A. Define ErrQ ,
Prx,B[A
C(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q]. We will bound ErrQ depending on all
the different possibilities for Q for which Pr[A queries Q] > 0.
• x1 /∈ span(Q): By Theorem 5.1.1, ErrQ ≥ 12 .
• |Q| ≤ 2: e1 ∈ span(Q) implies that at least one bit in Q is in R1 ∪ M̂1.
But we have already said that A never queries R1 ∪ M̂1.






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩Q| = k]·
Pr
B






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩Q| = k]·
Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = k]
Note that for any Q and 0 ≤ k ≤ 3, the events A queries Q and |B ∩Q|
= k are independent. So for any Q and 0 ≤ k ≤ 3, Pr[A queries Q; |B ∩
Q| = k] > 0. Thus, above we are conditioning on events with nonzero
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probability. The second equality above also holds because of the in-
dependence of A queries Q and |B ∩ Q| = k. For simplicity, define,
ErrQ,k , Prx,B[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ Q| = k]. We can





[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩Q| = k; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abc | A queries Q; |B ∩Q| = k]
For simplicity, let us define:
qQ,kabc , Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abc | A queries Q; |B ∩Q| = k]
e1 is not in the span of any two of the query bits taken by themselves,
because otherwise, at least one bit would be in R1 ∪ M̂1, and that would
violate our assumption on A. Thus, the sum of the three bits (when they

















[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 1 | A queries Q; |B ∩Q| = k; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
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The event |B ∩ Q| = k does not depend on the internal randomness of
















[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 1 | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
This motivates us to make the following definition. For a, b, c ∈ {0, 1},
pQabc , Pr
x,B















No two query bits are equal, because otherwise, the third one would be
in R1, which would also violate our assumption on A. Since the sum
of the three bits is e1, the three bits are linearly independent. Since,
also, x is uniformly random, Fact 5.1.2 (C(x) + B)j1 , (C(x) + B)j2 ,
and (C(x) + B)j3 are three independent, uniformly random bits. Thus,
∀k, a, b, c: qQ,kabc = 18 . So, when k is even,
ErrQ,k =
(
(1− pQ000) + (1− p
Q
011) + (1− p
Q













For simplicity, define PQ ,
(
(1 − pQ000) + (1 − p
Q
011) + (1 − p
Q





















(1− pQ100) + (1− p
Q
010) + (1− p
Q






By Lemma 5.2.2, we know the following two things:
Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = 0] + Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = 2]
≥ (1− β)3 − 9
γm
+ 3β2(1− β)− 9
γm
≥ (1− β)3 + 3β2(1− β)− 18
γm




[|B ∩Q| = 1] + Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = 3]
≥ 3β(1− β)2 − 9
γm
+ β3 − 9
γm
≥ 3β(1− β)2 + β3 − 36
m
Combining everything, we find
ErrQ ≥
(








= 3β(1− β)2 + β3 − 36
m
+(
(1− β)3 + 3β2(1− β)− 3β(1− β)2 − β3
)
PQ








Because β ≤ 1
2
, ErrQ ≥ 3β(1− β)2 + β3 − 36m .
Since for all Q, ErrQ ≥ 3β(1 − β)2 + β3 − 36m , Prx,B[A
C(x)+B(1) 6=
x1] ≥ 3β(1 − β)2 + β3 − 36m . Thus, there exists an x and B such that
Pr[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1] ≥ 3β(1 − β)2 + β3 − 36m , where the probability is only
over the internal coin flips of A.




). When β = δ−α−ν
γ
, first note that
the expression 3β(1 − β)2 + β3 is strictly increasing in β. Therefore, we can
lower bound 3β(1−β)2+β3− 36
m








































































The lower bound of Katz and Trevisan [32] implies that m > n, for
large enough n. Therefore, this expression is more than 1
2
− ε. (It is appar-
ent now that the choice of α at the start of the proof was made so that ξ =
δ − α− ν − (36
n




When β = 1
2








− ε for large enough
n (again, note that m > n).
So, we have shown there is a situation in which the error is more than
1
2
−ε. But this contradicts the fact that the recovery algorithm achieves (3, δ, ε)
on C.
We note that this theorem can be extended for all δ and sub-constant
ε. We make no restrictions on δ in the proof, although, for the bound to be
non-trivial, we need δ > Ω( 1
n1/3
) (because ε ≤ 1
2
). We do make a restriction of
ε in the proof – we need ε > Ω( 1
n
). This all means that when δ is small, the
range of usefulness of this theorem 1
2
+ ε > 1 − 3δ(1 − δ)2 − δ3 + O( 1
n1/3
) is
very close to the δ versus ε tradeoff of the best known three query construction
from Woodruff [46]: 1
2
+ ε = 1− 3δ − η, where η > 0 is arbitrarily small.
As an addendum, here are the small facts used above.
Fact 6.1.3 Let Z(β) , 3β(1 − β)2 + β3. For any β and ρ ≥ 0, Z(β + ρ) ≥
Z(β) + ρ3.
Proof: Let x , β + ρ/2 and p , ρ/2. So now we need to lower bound
Z(x + p) − Z(x − p). Note that Z(x) can be expressed as 3x − 6x2 + 4x3.
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Therefore,
Z(x+ p)− Z(x− p)
=
(
















(x+ p)3 − (x− p)3
)
= 3(2p)− 6(4xp) + 4(6x2p+ 2p3)
= 6p− 24xp+ 24x2p+ 8p3
= 3ρ− 12xρ+ 12x2ρ+ ρ3
= 3ρ(1− 2x)2 + ρ3
≥ ρ3
Fact 6.1.4 Let Z(β) , 3β(1− β)2 + β3. For any β and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 such that
0 ≤ β + ρ
2
≤ 1, Z(β + ρ) ≤ Z(β) + 4ρ.
Proof: We can use the same notation and the same first several steps of
the Fact 6.1.3 to get
Z(x+ p)− Z(x− p) = 3ρ(1− 2x)2 + ρ3 ≤ 3ρ+ ρ3 ≤ 4ρ
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6.2 Three Query, Binary, Possibly Non-Linear LDCs
In this section, we extend our lower bound on the length of three query
linear LDCs to the possibly non-linear case. We use a combinatorial lemma
from Ben-Aroya et al. [8]. This lemma is the foundation for the first classical
proof that non-linear, two query LDCs must have exponential length. Re-
call that this result was first obtained using quantum computing methods by
Kerenidis and de Wolf [34]. Here is the combinatorial lemma, implicit from
Theorem 11 in [8].
Theorem 6.2.1 ([8].) Let 0 ≤ ε, c ≤ 1
2
be constants. Let a1, ... am be a
sequence of (not necessarily distinct) {0, 1}n → {0, 1} functions such that for
every i ∈ [n] there is a set Mi of disjoint pairs (|Mi| ≥ cm) of indices {j1, j2}
such that∣∣∣ Pr
x∈{0,1}n
[x = aj1(x) + aj2(x)]− Pr
x∈{0,1}n
[x 6= aj1(x) + aj2(x)]
∣∣∣ ≥ ε
Then m ≥ 2c2ε2n.
Now here is our new three query, binary, possibly non-linear lower
bound.
Theorem 6.2.2 Fix t1 > 0 and t2 > 0. Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a
(q = 3, δ, ε)-LDC with constant ε > 3
2
(t1 + t2) and n large enough. Let α ,






(t1 + t2) +
36
n







. If α > 0,
then m ≥ 2.225α2t22n.
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Note 1: α > 0 when 1
2






)1/3 +ν). When 1
2
+ ε > µ+1−3δ(1−δ)2−δ3 +φ(n) for some
µ ≥ 0, then Fact 6.1.4 implies 1
2







Therefore, α > µ
4
.
Note 2: An appealing combination of t1 and t2 (t1 = t2 =
1
n1/3
) gives the fol-
lowing bound: Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a (q = 3, δ, ε)-LDC with constant
ε > 3
n1/3








)1/3 − ν ≥ 0






. If α > 0, then m ≥ 2.225α2n1/3 .
Proof: For i ∈ [n], define:
Ri ,
{
j ∈ [m] |
∣∣∣ Pr
x∈{0,1}n




Also, for each i ∈ [n], let Mi be a largest matching of edges {j1, j2} ⊂
[m] such that∣∣∣ Pr
x∈{0,1}n
[xi = C(x)j1 + C(x)j2 ]− Pr
x∈{0,1}n
[xi 6= C(x)j1 + C(x)j2 ]
∣∣∣ ≥ t2
For emphasis, no two edges in Mi can intersect because it is a matching.






(t1 + t2) +
36
n








will see the rationale for this choice at the end of the proof. Now consider:
S1 ,
{














If |S2| < .9n, then let us consider the following. Clearly |S1|νm ≤
∑
i∈[n] |Ri|.
So there exists a j ∈ [m] belonging to at least ν|S1| of the Ri sets. Theorem 2















.1n. So S̄1∩ S̄2 contains at least one i. Without loss of generality, 1 ∈ S̄1∩ S̄2.
That is, |R1| < νm and |M1| < α2m. Consider what happens when the recov-
ery algorithm is tasked to find x1.
Because the argument below works for arbitrary algorithms, without
loss of generality, we can assume the algorithm always queries three positions.
If the algorithm ever queried fewer than three positions, have it query more
and ignore the additional values obtained.
Construct M̂1 ⊂ [m] as the union of all the members in M1. So |M̂1| =
2|M1|.
Define γ , |[m]\(R1∪M̂1)|
m




). Let A be a (q, δ, ε)
algorithm for C. Let us consider the probability of error of the decoder over
uniformly random x ∈ {0, 1}n, uniformly random B1 ⊂ [m] \ (R1 ∪ M̂1) such
that |B1| = βγm, uniformly random B2 ⊆ R1 ∪ M̂1, and the internal ran-
domness of A. (For emphasis, the adversary chooses B1 to always have the
same size; but, for B2, it chooses whether to include each member of R1 ∪ M̂1
independently.) For convenience, define B , B1 ∪ B2. Let C(x) + B denote
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the codeword for x, corrupted in the positions determined by B. Note that
|B| ≤ δm always. Because of Lemma 5.2.1, we can, without loss of generality,
assume that A never queries R1 ∪ M̂1.
Without loss of generality, we assume that A flips all of its random coins
first, and then, based on those random values, chooses a query set Q ⊂ [m]
and a deterministic function φ to apply on the three values it receives from
querying Q. Without loss of generality, Q = {1, 2, 3}. We use the shorthand









[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | Q, φ] Pr[Q, φ]
Define ErrQ,φ , Prx,B[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | Q, φ]. We will bound ErrQ,φ
using the following concept. Define the correlation between two Boolean func-
tions f and g as
Corr(f, g) , Pr
x
[f(x) = g(x)]− Pr
x
[f(x) 6= g(x)]
Let us consider the quantity |Corr(xi, φ(Y1, Y2, Y3))|. With
χS(Y1, Y2, Y3) ,
∑
s∈S Ys for S ⊆ {1, 2, 3}, Lemma 6.2.3 at the end of this
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∣∣∣Corr(xi, χS(Y1, Y2, Y3))∣∣∣+
∑
S⊆{1,2,3} : |S|=2
∣∣∣Corr(xi, χS(Y1, Y2, Y3))∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣Corr(xi, Y1 + Y2 + Y3)∣∣∣




three absolute values in the second term are each at most t1. This is because
for any j ∈ [m], if |Corr(xi,C(x)j)| > t1, then j1 is corrupted by B into a
uniformly random value in {0, 1}. Therefore, the correlation of the corrupted
value with xi is 0. Similarly, the three absolute values in the third term above
are each at most t2. (Note that if two members of {1, 2, 3}, for instance {1, 2},
have |Corr(xi,C(x)1 + C(x)2)| > t2 then at least one of {1, 2} must be in M̂i
and so are corrupted, or else Mi would not be a maximum matching.) This
gives: ∣∣∣Corr(xi, φ(Y1, Y2, Y3))∣∣∣ ≤ 3t1 + 3t2 + ∣∣∣Corr(xi, Y1 + Y2 + Y3)∣∣∣
For simplicity, let us temporarily just operate on |Corr(xi, Y1+Y2+Y3)|:∣∣∣Corr(xi, Y1 + Y2 + Y3)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Pr[xi = Y1 + Y2 + Y3]− Pr[xi 6= Y1 + Y2 + Y3]∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Pr[0 = xi + Y1 + Y2 + Y3]− Pr[0 6= xi + Y1 + Y2 + Y3]∣∣∣
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Because of the independence of x and B, we have:
=
∣∣∣Pr[0 = xi + C(x)1 + C(x)2 + C(x)3] Pr[0 = B1 +B2 +B3]+
Pr[1 = xi + C(x)1 + C(x)2 + C(x)3] Pr[1 = B1 +B2 +B3]−
Pr[0 = xi + C(x)1 + C(x)2 + C(x)3] Pr[1 = B1 +B2 +B3]−
Pr[1 = xi + C(x)1 + C(x)2 + C(x)3] Pr[0 = B1 +B2 +B3]
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣(Pr[0 = xi + C(x)1 + C(x)2 + C(x)3]−
Pr[1 = xi + C(x)1 + C(x)2 + C(x)3])
(Pr[0 = B1 +B2 +B3]− Pr[1 = B1 +B2 +B3])
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Corr(xi,C(x)1 + C(x)2 + C(x)3)Corr(0, B1 +B2 +B3)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣Corr(xi,C(x)1 + C(x)2 + C(x)3)∣∣∣∣∣∣Corr(0, B1 +B2 +B3)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣Corr(0, B1 +B2 +B3)∣∣∣
Each member of B has been corrupted with probability at least β. By
Lemma 5.2.2, we know:
Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = 1] + Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = 3] ≥ 3β(1− β)2 − 9
γm
+ β3 − 9
γm
≥ 3β(1− β)2 + β3 − 36
m
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Because β ≤ 1
2
, we have∣∣∣Corr(xi, φ(Y1, Y2, Y3))∣∣∣




[|B ∩Q| = 1]− Pr
B





[|B ∩Q| = 1] + Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = 3])
)




[|B ∩Q| = 1] + Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = 3]
)
≤ 3t1 + 3t2 + 1− 2
(
3β(1− β)2 + β3 − 36
m
)
Noting that ErrQ,φ ≤ 12 or else the algorithm would just guess ran-
domly, we have:
(1− ErrQ,φ)− ErrQ,φ =
∣∣∣(1− ErrQ,φ)− ErrQ,φ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Corr(xi, φ(Y1, Y2, Y3))∣∣∣











C(x)+B(1) 6= x1] ≥ 3β(1− β)2 + β3− 32(t1 + t2)−
36
m
. Thus, there exists




where the probability is only over the internal coin flips of A.




). When β = δ−α−ν
γ
, first note that
the expression 3β(1 − β)2 + β3 is strictly increasing in β. Therefore, we can
lower bound 3β(1 − β)2 + β3 − 3
2




3β̂(1 − β̂)2 + β̂3 − 3
2



















(t1 + t2) +
36
n




















(t1 + t2) +
36
n









































The lower bound of Katz and Trevisan [32] implies that m > n, for
large enough n. Therefore, this expression is more than 1
2
− ε. (It is ap-






)1/3 would be the solution to 3ξ(1−ξ)2+ξ3 = 1
2
−ε.)
When β = 1
2
, 3β(1−β)2 +β3− 3
2









for large enough n (again, note that m > n) and ε > 3
2
(t1 + t2).
So, we have shown there is a situation in which the error is more than
1
2
−ε. But this contradicts the fact that the recovery algorithm achieves (3, δ, ε)
on C.
Lemma 6.2.3 Define χS(Y1, Y2, Y3) ,
∑
s∈S Ys. For any Boolean functions f
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and g(Y1, Y2, Y3),∣∣∣Corr(f, g)∣∣∣ ≤ ∑
S⊆{1,2,3}
∣∣∣Corr(f, χS(Y1, Y2, Y3))∣∣∣
Proof: Since f and g are Boolean, we can express them using the {−1, 1}









), and g∗ will be defined analogously from g. Using this
notation,




Pr(X, Y1, Y2, Y3)f
∗(X)g∗(Y1, Y2, Y3)
where X is the input of f ∗. The Fourier decomposition of g∗ is:




S(Y1, Y2, Y3) where the ĝ(S) are constants and
χ∗S(Y1, Y2, Y3) ,
∏
s∈S Ys for S ⊆ {1, 2, 3}. Therefore,
Corr(f ∗, g∗) =∑
X∈{−1,1}n, Y1,Y2,Y3∈{−1,1}























Corr(f, χS(Y1, Y2, Y3))
∣∣∣
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6.3 Three Query, Linear LDCs over Any Field
Now we generalize the three query, binary lower bound to three query,
linear codes over any field. Instead of using the core combinatorial theorem
directly from Goldreich et al. [24], we use an adaptation of it by Dvir and
Shpilka [17]:
Theorem 6.3.1 ([17].) Let F be a field. Let a1, ... am be a sequence of
(not necessarily distinct) elements of F n such that for every i ∈ [n] there is a
set Mi of disjoint pairs of indices {j1, j2} such that ei ∈ span(aj1 , aj2). Then





Theorem 6.3.2 Let C: F n → Fm be a linear (q = 3, δ, ε)-LDC with constant




)1/3 − ν and ν , 10
n
.
Note: α > 0 when ε > |F |−1|F | ((1 − δ)
3 + φ(n)) with φ(n) = 4((27|F |
n
)1/3 + ν).
When ε > µ + |F |−1|F | ((1 − δ)
3 + φ(n)) for some µ ≥ 0, then Fact 6.3.4 implies









Proof: Claim 2.2 says that, without loss of generality, we can assume C
has no codeword position that is identically zero.
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For i ∈ [n], define:
Ri ,
{
j ∈ [m] | ∃c ∈ F ∗ : C(x)j = cxi
}
Also, for each i ∈ [n], let Mi be a largest matching of edges {j1, j2} ⊂
[m] such that there exists a non-zero linear combination of C(x)j1 and C(x)j2
equalling xi. For emphasis, no two edges in Mi can intersect because it is a
matching. Define α , δ + ( |F |ε|F |−1)
1/3 − 1 − (27|F |
n
)1/3 − ν where ν , 10
n
. We
will see the rationale for this choice at the end of the proof. If α ≤ 0: because
ε > 0 requires m ≥ 1, we are done. So assume α > 0. Now consider:
S1 ,
{









If |S2| ≥ .9n, then we can use Theorem 6.3.1 to conclude m ≥ 2.9∗.5αn−1.
If |S2| < .9n, then because we know that |S1| ≤ mνm = .1n, S̄1 ∩ S̄2 contains at
least one i. Without loss of generality, 1 ∈ S̄1 ∩ S̄2. That is, |R1| < νm and
|M1| < α2m. Consider what happens when the recovery algorithm is tasked to
find x1.
Construct M̂1 ⊂ [m] as the union of all the edges in M1. Note that
|M̂1| = 2|M1|.
Define γ , |[m]\(R1∪M̂1)|
m
and β , min( δ−α−ν
γ
, 1). Let A be a (q, δ, ε)
algorithm for C. Let us consider the probability of error of the decoder over
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uniformly random x ∈ F n and the following distribution for the adversary.
The adversary will choose B1 ⊂ [m] \ (R1 ∪ M̂1) uniformly at random such
that |B1| = βγm. The adversary will corrupt the codeword C(x) by adding
an independent, uniformly random member of F in the positions present in
B , B1 ∪ R1 ∪ M̂1. For simplicity, let C(x) + B denote this corrupted code-
word. Note that |B| ≤ δm always. Because of Lemma 5.2.1, we can, without
loss of generality, assume that A never queries R1 ∪ M̂1.









[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q] Pr[A queries Q]
Note that probability expressions involving A are also implicitly over
the internal randomness of A. Define ErrQ ,
Prx,B[A
C(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q]. We will bound ErrQ depending on all
the different possibilities for Q for which Pr[A queries Q] > 0.
• x1 /∈ span(Q): By Theorem 5.1.1, ErrQ ≥ 1|F | .
• |Q| ≤ 2: e1 ∈ span(Q) implies that at least one bit in Q is in R1 ∪ M̂1.
But we have already said that A never queries R1 ∪ M̂1.
• |Q| = 3 and e1 ∈ span {aj1 , aj2 , aj3}: e1 is not in the span of any two of
the bits taken by themselves, because otherwise, at least one bit would
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be in R1∪M̂1, and that would violate our assumption on A. Thus, there
exists a non-zero linear combination of the three bits that equals x1. Let
us call it L(C(x)j1 ,C(x)j2 ,C(x)j3) = x1.
Use the notationB·Q to mean L((C(0)+B)j1 , (C(0)+B)j2 , (C(0)+B)j3).






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;B ·Q = k]·
Pr
B
[B ·Q = k | A queries Q]
For simplicity, define, ErrQ,k , Prx,B[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;B ·





[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;B ·Q = k; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
· Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abc | A queries Q;B ·Q = k]
For simplicity, let us define:
qQ,kabc , Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abc | A queries Q;B ·Q = k]










[AC(x)+B(1) = r | A queries Q;B ·Q = k;
(C(x) +B)Q = abc]
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The event B ·Q = k does not depend on the internal randomness of A.






[AC(x)+B(1) = r | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
This motivates us to make the following definition. For a, b, c ∈ F ,
pQabc(r) , Pr
x,B














No two bits are equal, because otherwise, either at least one of the three
bits would be in M̂1 or the third bit would be in R1, which would also
violate our assumption on A. Since there is a non-zero linear combination
of the bits that equals e1, the three bits are linearly independent. Since,
also, x is uniformly random, Fact 5.1.2 shows that (C(x)+B)j1 , (C(x)+
B)j2 , and (C(x) + B)j3 are three independent, uniformly random bits.





















abc(L(a, b, c)− k) 1|F |3 . Note that∑














[B ·Q = k | |B ∩Q| > 0;A queries Q]·
Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| > 0 | A queries Q]+
Pr
B
[B ·Q = k | |B ∩Q| = 0;A queries Q]·
Pr
B









[B ·Q = k | |B ∩Q| > 0;A queries Q]·
Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| > 0]+
Pr
B
[B ·Q = k | |B ∩Q| = 0;A queries Q]·
Pr
B



















|F | − 1
|F |
(





(1− β)3 − 9
γm
)
≥ |F | − 1
|F |
(
1− (1− β)3 − 27
γm
)
≥ |F | − 1
|F |
(
1− (1− β)3 − 27|F |
m
)
We have used that γm > (1 − δ)m > m|F | in the last line. Since for all




C(x)+B(1) 6= x1] ≥ |F |−1|F | (1− (1−
β)3 − 27|F |
m
). Thus, there exists an x and B such that Pr[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1] ≥
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|F |−1
|F | (1− (1− β)
3− 27|F |
m
), where the probability is only over the internal coin
flips of A.
Remember that β = min( δ−α−ν
γ
, 1). When β = δ−α−ν
γ
, first note that the





) evaluated at β = δ−α−ν
γ




evaluated at β̂ = δ − α− ν = 1− ( |F |ε|F |−1)
1/3 + (27|F |
n
)1/3:
|F | − 1
|F |
(
1− (1− (1− ( |F |ε




)1/3))3 − 27|F |
m
)
Because of Fact 6.3.3, this expression is lower bounded by
≥ |F | − 1
|F |
(
1− (1− (1− ( |F |ε







The lower bound of Katz and Trevisan [32] implies that m > n, for
large enough n. Therefore, this expression is more than
>
|F | − 1
|F |
(
1− (1− (1− ( |F |ε




|F | − 1
|F |
(
1− (( |F |ε








|F | − 1
)
=
|F | − 1
|F |
− ε
(It is apparent now that the choice of α at the start of the proof was
made so that ξ = δ−α−ν−(27|F |
n
)1/3 would be the solution to |F |−1|F | (1−(1−ξ)
3)
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= |F |−1|F | − ε.)
When β = 1, |F |−1|F | (1− (1− β)
3 − 27|F |
m
) > |F |−1|F | −
27|F |
m
> |F |−1|F | − ε for
large enough n (again, note that m > n).
So, we have shown there is a situation in which the error is more than
|F |−1
|F | − ε. But this contradicts the fact that the recovery algorithm achieves
(3, δ, ε) on C.
As an addendum, here are the small facts used above.
Fact 6.3.3 Let Z(β) , 1− (1− β)3. For any 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 such
that 1− β − ρ ≥ 0, Z(β + ρ) ≥ Z(β) + ρ3.
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Proof:(






= (1− β)3 −
(








1− 3(β + ρ) + 3(β + ρ)2 − (β + ρ)3
)
= 3ρ+ 3β2 − β3 − 3
(




β3 + 3β2ρ+ 3βρ2 + ρ3
)
= 3ρ− 6βρ− 3ρ2 + 3β2ρ+ 3βρ2 + ρ3
= 3ρ(1− 2β − ρ+ β2 + βρ) + ρ3
= 3ρ
(
(1− β)2 − ρ(1− β)
)
+ ρ3
= 3ρ(1− β)(1− β − ρ) + ρ3
≥ ρ3
Fact 6.3.4 Let Z(β) , 1 − (1 − β)3. For any β ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 with
1− β − ρ ≤ 1, Z(β + ρ) ≤ Z(β) + 4ρ.
Proof: We can use the same first several steps of the Fact 6.3.3 to get
Z(β + ρ)− Z(β) = 3ρ(1− β)(1− β − ρ) + ρ3 ≤ 3ρ+ ρ3 ≤ 4ρ
By improving the adversary, we can get an even stronger bound for the
non-binary case.
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Theorem 6.3.5 Let C: F n → Fm be a linear (q = 3, δ, ε)-LDC with constant
ε > 0, δ ≤ |F |−1|F | , and n large enough. Then, m ≥ 2
.45αn−1 where α , δ +
ε1/3(1− 1|F |)
2/3 + 1|F | − 1− (
108|F |
n
)1/3 − ν where ν , 10
n
.
Note: α > 0 when 1|F | + ε > 1 − 3δ(1 − δ)
2 − (1 − 1|F |−1)3δ
2(1 − δ) −
(1 − 1|F |−1 +
1
(|F |−1)2 )δ
3 + φ(n) with φ(n) = (108|F |
n
)1/3 + ν. When 1|F | + ε >
µ+ 1− 3δ(1− δ)2 − (1− 1|F |−1)3δ
2(1− δ)− (1− 1|F |−1 +
1
(|F |−1)2 )δ
3 + φ(n) for
some µ ≥ 0, then Fact 6.3.7 implies 1|F |+ε > 1−3δ̂(1− δ̂)
2− (1− 1|F |−1)3δ̂
2(1−
δ̂)− (1− 1|F |−1 +
1
(|F |−1)2 )δ̂
3 + φ(n) for δ̂ = δ − µ
4
. Therefore, α > µ
4
.
Proof: Claim 2.2 says that, without loss of generality, we can assume C
has no codeword position that is identically zero.
For i ∈ [n], define:
Ri ,
{
j ∈ [m] | ∃c ∈ F ∗ : C(x)j = cxi
}
Also, for each i ∈ [n], let Mi be a largest matching of edges {j1, j2} ⊂
[m] such that there exists a non-zero linear combination of C(x)j1 and C(x)j2
equalling xi. For emphasis, no two edges in Mi can intersect because it is a
matching. Define α , δ + ε1/3(1 − 1|F |)
2/3 + 1|F | − 1 − (
108|F |
n
)1/3 − ν where
ν , 10
n
. We will see the rationale for this choice at the end of the proof. If














If |S2| ≥ .9n, then we can use Theorem 6.3.1 to conclude m ≥ 2.9∗.5αn−1.
If |S2| < .9n, then because we know that |S1| ≤ mνm = .1n, S̄1 ∩ S̄2 contains at
least one i. Without loss of generality, 1 ∈ S̄1 ∩ S̄2. That is, |R1| < νm and
|M1| < α2m. Consider what happens when the recovery algorithm is tasked to
find x1.
Construct M̂1 ⊂ [m] as the union of all the edges in M1. Note that
|M̂1| = 2|M1|.
Define γ , |[m]\(R1∪M̂1)|
m
and β , min( δ−α−ν
γ
, 1). Let A be a (q, δ, ε)
algorithm for C. Let us consider the probability of error of the decoder over
uniformly random x ∈ F n and the following distribution for the adversary.
The adversary will choose B1 ⊂ [m] \ (R1 ∪ M̂1) uniformly at random such
that |B1| = βγm. The adversary will corrupt the codeword C(x) by adding
an independent, uniformly random member of F in the positions present in
R1 ∪ M̂1 and adding an independent, uniformly random member of F ∗ in
the positions present in B1. For simplicity, let B , B1 ∪ R1 ∪ M̂1, and let
C(x) + B denote this corrupted codeword. Note that |B| ≤ δm always. Be-
cause of Lemma 5.2.1, we can, without loss of generality, assume that A never
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queries R1 ∪ M̂1.









[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q] Pr[A queries Q]
Note that probability expressions involving A are also implicitly over
the internal randomness of A. Define ErrQ ,
Prx,B[A
C(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q]. We will bound ErrQ depending on all
the different possibilities for Q for which Pr[A queries Q] > 0.
• x1 /∈ span(Q): By Theorem 5.1.1, ErrQ ≥ 1|F | .
• |Q| ≤ 2: e1 ∈ span(Q) implies that at least one bit in Q is in R1 ∪ M̂1.
But we have already said that A never queries R1 ∪ M̂1.
• |Q| = 3 and e1 ∈ span {aj1 , aj2 , aj3}: e1 is not in the span of any two of
the bits taken by themselves, because otherwise, at least one bit would
be in R1∪M̂1, and that would violate our assumption on A. Thus, there
exists a non-zero linear combination of the three bits that equals x1. Let
us call it L(C(x)j1 ,C(x)j2 ,C(x)j3) = x1.
Use the notation B · Q to mean L
(










[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;B ·Q = k]·
Pr
B
[B ·Q = k | A queries Q]
For simplicity, define, ErrQ,k , Prx,B[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;B ·





[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;B ·Q = k; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
· Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abc | A queries Q;B ·Q = k]
For simplicity, let us define:
qQ,kabc , Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abc | A queries Q;B ·Q = k]










[AC(x)+B(1) = r | A queries Q;B ·Q = k;
(C(x) +B)Q = abc]
The event B ·Q = k does not depend on the internal randomness of A.






[AC(x)+B(1) = r | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
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This motivates us to make the following definition. For a, b, c ∈ F ,
pQabc(r) , Pr
x,B














No two bits are equal, because otherwise, either one of the three bits
would be in M̂1 or the third bit would be in R1, which would also violate
our assumption on A. Since there exists a non-zero linear combination
of the three bits that equals e1, the three bits are linearly independent.
Since, also, x is uniformly random, Fact 5.1.2 shows that (C(x) + B)j1 ,
(C(x)+B)j2 , and (C(x)+B)j3 are three independent, uniformly random












(1− pQabc(L(a, b, c)− k))
1
|F |3




abc(L(a, b, c)− k) 1|F |3 . So ErrQ,k
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[B ·Q = k | A queries Q]















[B ·Q = k | |B ∩Q| = l;A queries Q]·
Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = l | A queries Q]






[B ·Q = k | |B ∩Q| = l;A queries Q]·
Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = l]
Here is a table of values for PrB[B · Q = k | |B ∩ Q| = l;A queries Q]
depending on k and l:
k = 0, l = 0 : 1 k 6= 0, l = 0 : 0
k = 0, l = 1 : 0 k 6= 0, l = 1 : 1
|F | − 1
k = 0, l = 2 :
1
|F | − 1
k 6= 0, l = 2 :
1
|F | − 1
(1− 1
|F | − 1
)
k = 0, l = 3 :
1
|F | − 1
(1− 1
|F | − 1
) k 6= 0, l = 3 :
1
|F | − 1
(1− 1
|F | − 1
(1− 1
|F | − 1
))
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Plugging these values in,






[B ·Q = k | |B ∩Q| = l;A queries Q]·
Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = l]






where W1 and W2 are defined as:
W1 , (1− β)3 +
1
|F | − 1
3β2(1− β) + ( 1
|F | − 1
− 1




|F | − 1
3β(1− β2) + ( 1
|F | − 1
− 1




|F | − 1
− 1
(|F | − 1)2
+
1
(|F | − 1)3
)β3
Thus,
ErrQ ≥ (|F | − 1)
(








(1− β − β









|F | − 1
− 1




|F | − 1
− 1
(|F | − 1)2
+
1





Since β ≤ δ ≤ |F |−1|F | , we have
ErrQ ≥ (|F | − 1)
( 1




|F | − 1
− 1




|F | − 1
− 1
(|F | − 1)2
+
1
(|F | − 1)3
)β3 − 27
(|F | − 1)γm
)
> 3β(1− β)2 + (1− 1
|F | − 1
)3β2(1− β)+
(1− 1
|F | − 1
+
1
(|F | − 1)2
)β3 − 27|F |
m
We have used that γm > (1− δ)m > m|F | in the last line. For simplicity,
define
Z(β) , 3β(1− β)2 + (1− 1
|F | − 1
)3β2(1− β) + (1− 1
|F | − 1
+
1
(|F | − 1)2
)β3
Since for all Q, ErrQ ≥ Z(β) − 27|F |m , Prx,B[A
C(x)+B(1) 6= x1] ≥
Z(β)− 27|F |
m
. Thus, there exists an x and B such that Pr[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1] ≥
Z(β)− 27|F |
m
, where the probability is only over the internal coin flips of A.
Remember that β = δ−α−ν
γ
≤ |F |−1|F | . First note that Z(β) is strictly
increasing in β. So
Z(




























For simplicity, define β̂ = 1 − 1|F | − ε
1/3(1 − 1|F |)
2/3. Because of Fact


















= 3β̂(1− β̂)2 + (1− 1
|F | − 1
)3β̂2(1− β̂) + (1− 1
|F | − 1
+
1
(|F | − 1)2
)β̂3
=
|F | − 1
|F |
− ε
The last line can be checked by algebra. (It is apparent now that the
choice of α at the start of the proof was made so that ξ = δ−α−ν−(108|F |
n
)1/3
would be the solution to 3ξ(1−ξ)2+(1− 1|F |−1)3ξ




= |F |−1|F | − ε.)
When β = |F |−1|F | , Z(β)−
27|F |
m
= |F |−1|F | −
27|F |
m
> |F |−1|F | −ε for large enough
n (again, note that m > n).
So, we have shown there is a situation in which the error is more than
|F |−1
|F | − ε. But this contradicts the fact that the recovery algorithm achieves
(3, δ, ε) on C.
As an addendum, here are the small facts used above.
Fact 6.3.6 Let Z(β) , 3β(1 − β)2 + (1 − 1|F |−1)3β
2(1 − β) + (1 − 1|F |−1 +
1
(|F |−1)2 )β




Proof: For easier notation, let c , 1|F |−1 . We can rewrite Z(β):
Z(β) = 3β(1− β)2 + (1− c)3β2(1− β) + (1− c+ c2)β3
= 3β − 6β2 + 3β3 + (1− c)3β2 − (1− c)3β3 + (1− c+ c2)β3
= 3β + (−3− 3c)β2 + (1 + 2c+ c2)β3
= 3β − 3dβ2 + d2β3 where d , 1 + c
Let x , β + ρ/2 and p , ρ/2. So now we need to lower bound Z(x +
p)− Z(x− p). Therefore,
Z(x+ p)− Z(x− p)
=
(
3(x+ p)− 3d(x+ p)2 + d2(x+ p)3
)
−(













(x+ p)3 − (x− p)3
)
= 3(2p)− 3d(4xp) + d2(6x2p+ 2p3)
= 6p− 12dxp+ 6d2x2p+ 2d2p3












Fact 6.3.7 Let Z(β) , 3β(1 − β)2 + (1 − 1|F |−1)3β
2(1 − β) + (1 − 1|F |−1 +
1
(|F |−1)2 )β






Proof: We can use the same notation and the same first several steps of
the Fact 6.3.6 to get
Z(x+ p)− Z(x− p) = 3ρ(1− dx)2 + d
2
4
ρ3 ≤ 3ρ+ ρ3 ≤ 4ρ
Remark: Since the length lower bounds for binary codes have depended
on Theorem 6.1.1 and the length lower bounds for codes over arbitrary fields
have depended on a generalization of Theorem 6.1.1, one might wonder if
Theorem 6.1.1 can be improved. In fact it has been slightly improved, in
Ben-Sasson and Viderman [9]. However, the improvement only exists for α =
O( logm
m
). The values of α in this range are too tiny to improve our proofs.
105
Chapter 7
Length Lower Bounds for Four Query, Linear,
Binary LDCs
Now we extend our length lower bound techniques to four query, linear,
binary LDCs. It is interesting that the bound we obtain for four query, linear,
binary LDCs (length in terms of delta and epsilon) is very close to the bound
we obtained earlier for three query, linear, binary LDCs.
Theorem 7.1 Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a linear (q = 4, δ, ε)-LDC with







)1/3 − ν where ν , 10
n
.
Note: α > 0 when 1
2





+ ε > µ+ 1− 3δ(1− δ)2 − δ3 + φ(n) for some µ ≥ 0, then Fact 6.1.4
implies 1
2






)3 +φ(n). Therefore, α > µ
4
.
Proof: Claim 2.2 says that, without loss of generality, we can assume C
has no codeword position that is identically zero.
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For i ∈ [n], define:
Ri ,
{
j ∈ [m] | C(x)j = xi
}
Also, for each i ∈ [n], let Mi be a largest matching of edges {j1, j2} ⊂
[m] such that C(x)j1 + C(x)j2 = xi. For emphasis, no two edges in Mi can






)1/3 − ν, where
ν , 10
n
. We will see the rationale for the choice of α at the end of the proof.








i ∈ [n] | |Mi| ≥ αm
}
If |S2| ≥ .9n, then we can use Theorem 6.1.1 to conclude m ≥ 22∗.9αn.
If |S2| < .9n, then because we know that |S1| ≤ mνm = .1n, S̄1 ∩ S̄2 contains at
least one i. Without loss of generality, 1 ∈ S̄1 ∩ S̄2. That is, |R1| < νm and
|M1| < αm. Consider what happens when the recovery algorithm is tasked to
find x1.
We now construct a node cover M̂1 ⊂ [m] of those edges {j1, j2} ⊂ [m]
such that C(x)j1 + C(x)j2 = xi. The graph formed by these edges a union of
complete bipartite subgraphs. In each complete bipartite subgraph, the ver-
tices on one of its sides all correspond to the same vector in {0, 1}n – call it a.
The vertices on the other side all correspond to a+e1. Therefore, to construct
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a small node cover, we can take the union of the vertices of the smaller side
of each complete bipartite subgraph. Now, since M1 is a largest matching of
these edges, it has one member for each vertex on the smaller side of each
complete bipartite subgraph, as well. Therefore, |M̂1| = |M1|.
Define γ , |[m]\(R1∪M̂1)|
m




). Let A be a (q, δ, ε)
algorithm for C. Let us consider the probability of error of the decoder over
uniformly random x ∈ {0, 1}n, uniformly random B1 ⊂ [m] \ (R1 ∪ M̂1) such
that |B1| = βγm, uniformly random B2 ⊆ R1 ∪ M̂1, and the internal ran-
domness of A. (For emphasis, the adversary chooses B1 to always have the
same size; but, for B2, it chooses whether to include each member of R1 ∪ M̂1
independently.) For convenience, define B , B1 ∪ B2. Let C(x) + B denote
the codeword for x, corrupted in the positions determined by B. Note that
|B| ≤ δm always. Make the following transformation on A (which will let
us combine cases in our analysis below): whenever A queries fewer than four
positions, have it arbitrarily query more so instead it queries four. This trans-
formation cannot reduce the correctness of A, because A can ignore the extra
values it gets. Because of Lemma 5.2.1, we can, without loss of generality,
assume that A never queries R1 ∪ M̂1.
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[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q] Pr[A queries Q]
Note that probability expressions involving A are also implicitly over
the internal randomness of A. Define ErrQ ,
Prx,B[A
C(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q]. We will bound ErrQ depending on all
the different possibilities for Q for which Pr[A queries Q] > 0. First we give
some notation.
Write Q = {j1, j2, j3, j4}. For Q and a, b, c, d ∈ {0, 1} such that
Prx,B[A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd] > 0, define
pQabcd , Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = 0 | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]
For simplicity, let us define the following notation. For a given S ⊆ Q,
qQ,kabcd(S) , Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abcd | A queries Q; |B ∩ S| = k]
On an intuitive level, the cases below have similarities to each other,
but they use different S in their analyses. Here are the possibilities for Q:
• x1 /∈ span(Q): By Theorem 5.1.1, ErrQ ≥ 12 .
• e1 is in the span of three of the vectors representing the bits, say aj1 ,
aj2 , and aj3 , taken by themselves; and aj4 /∈ span {aj1 , aj2 , aj3}: Define
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[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ Q̂| = k]·
Pr
B






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ Q̂| = k]·
Pr
B
[|B ∩ Q̂| = k]
Note that for any Q and 0 ≤ k ≤ 3, the events A queries Q and |B ∩ Q̂|
= k are independent. So for any Q and 0 ≤ k ≤ 3, Pr[A queries Q; |B ∩
Q| = k̂] > 0. Thus, above we are conditioning on events with nonzero
probability. The second equality above also holds because of the in-
dependence of A queries Q and |B ∩ Q̂| = k. For simplicity, define,
ErrQ,k , Prx,B[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ Q̂| = k]. We can







[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ Q̂| = k; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]
e1 is not in the span of any two of aj1 , aj2 , and aj3 taken by themselves,
because otherwise, at least one bit would be in R1 ∪ M̂1, and that would
violate our assumption on A. Thus the sum of aj1 , aj2 , and aj3 is e1. (In
this proof, additions involving codeword bits are implicitly modulo 2.)
110
















[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ Q̂| = k; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]
The event |B ∩ Q̂| = k does not depend on the internal randomness of































No two bits of aj1 , aj2 , and aj3 are equal, because otherwise, the third
one would be in R1, which would also violate our assumption on A.
Since the sum of aj1 , aj2 , and aj3 is e1 and aj4 /∈ span {aj1 , aj2 , aj3}, aj1 ,
aj2 , aj3 , and aj4 are linearly independent. Since, also, x is uniformly
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random, Fact 5.1.2 shows that (C(x)+B)j1 , (C(x)+B)j2 , (C(x)+B)j3 ,
and (C(x) + B)j4 are four independent, uniformly random bits. Thus,
∀k, a, b, c, d: qQ,kabcd = 116 . So, when k is even,
ErrQ,k =
(
(1− pQ0000) + (1− p
Q
0110) + (1− p
Q










(1− pQ0001) + (1− p
Q
0111) + (1− p
Q























(1− pQ1000) + (1− p
Q
0100) + (1− p
Q










(1− pQ1001) + (1− p
Q
0101) + (1− p
Q







By Lemma 5.2.2, we know the following two things:
Pr
B
[|B ∩ Q̂| = 0] + Pr
B
[|B ∩ Q̂| = 2]
≥ (1− β)3 − 9
γm
+ 3β2(1− β)− 9
γm




[|B ∩ Q̂| = 1] + Pr
B
[|B ∩ Q̂| = 3]
≥ 3β(1− β)2 − 9
γm
+ β3 − 9
γm
≥ 3β(1− β)2 + β3 − 36
m
Combining everything, we find
ErrQ ≥
(








= 3β(1− β)2 + β3 − 36
m
+(
(1− β)3 + 3β2(1− β)− 3β(1− β)2 − β3
)
PQ







Because β ≤ 1
2
, ErrQ ≥ 3β(1− β)2 + β3 − 36m .
• e1 is in the span of three of the vectors representing the bits, say aj1 ,
aj2 , and aj3 , taken by themselves; and aj4 ∈ span {aj1 , aj2 , aj3}: Since
no member of Q is in R1 ∪ M̂1, C(x)j1 + C(x)j2 + C(x)j3 = x1. C(x)j4
cannot be the sum of the other three members of Q, because otherwise,
j4 would be in R1, and that would violate our assumption on A. C(x)j4
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cannot be the sum of two other members of Q – say C(x)j1 + C(x)j2 =
C(x)j4 , because otherwise, j3 or j4 would be in M̂1, which would also
violate our assumption on A. So C(x)j4 equals one of the other members
– assume it is C(x)j1 .
Define Z as the event that either both j1 and j4 are corrupted or neither
are. Define Q̂ , {j1, j2, j3}. Consider the decomposition:
ErrQ = Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; Z̄] Pr
B
[Z̄ | A queries Q]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;Z] Pr
B
[Z | A queries Q]
= Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; Z̄] Pr
B




[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;Z; |B ∩ Q̂| = k]·
Pr
B




[Z | A queries Q]
Note that for any Q, the events A queries Q and Z are independent.
So for any Q, Pr[A queries Q;Z] > 0. Thus, above we are conditioning
on events with nonzero probability. For any Q and k, Pr[|B ∩ Q̂| =
k;A queries Q;Z] > 0, so we are not conditioning on zero probability
events after the second equality, either. Because the events Z and A
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queries Q are independent, the expression above becomes
ErrQ = Pr
x,B






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;Z; |B ∩ Q̂| = k]·
Pr
B





Let us first consider the error conditioned on Z̄. For simplicity, define,
ErrQ,Z̄ , Prx,B[A






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; Z̄; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abcd | A queries Q; Z̄]
For simplicity, let us define (when d 6= a):
qQ,Z̄abcd , Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abcd | A queries Q; Z̄]
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[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[j1 ∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; j4 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[j4 ∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]
)
qQ,Z̄abcd
If A queries Q, Z̄, and (C(x) +B)Q = abcd, over random x and B, then









[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j4 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]
)
Now, conditioning on whether |{j2, j3} ∩ B|mod 2 is 0 or 1, and using
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[AC(x)+B(1) 6= a+ b+ c | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B;
|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 0; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 0 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abcd]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = a+ b+ c | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B;
|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 1; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abcd]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = a+ b+ c | A queries Q; Z̄; j4 ∈ B;
|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 0; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 0 | A queries Q; Z̄; j4 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abcd]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) 6= a+ b+ c | A queries Q; Z̄; j4 ∈ B;
|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 1; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j4 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abcd]
)
qQ,Z̄abcd
The events Z̄, j1 ∈ B, j4 ∈ B, and |{j2, j3} ∩ B|mod 2 = 0 are each










[AC(x)+B(1) 6= a+ b+ c | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 0 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abcd]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = a+ b+ c | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abcd]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = a+ b+ c | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 0 | A queries Q; Z̄; j4 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abcd]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) 6= a+ b+ c | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j4 ∈ B;







[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abcd]
= Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 1 | Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]
= Pr
x,B
[x1 = a+ b+ c | Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]
= Pr
x,B
[x1 = a+ b+ c | Z̄; j4 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = dbca]
= Pr
x,B
[x1 = d+ b+ c | Z̄; j4 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]
= Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 1 | Z̄; j4 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]
= Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j4 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abcd]
Likewise, it is also true that
Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 0 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abcd] =
Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 0 | A queries Q; Z̄; j4 ∈ B;












[AC(x)+B(1) 6= a+ b+ c | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 0 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abcd]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = a+ b+ c | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abcd]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = a+ b+ c | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 0 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abcd]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) 6= a+ b+ c | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B;












[AC(x)+B(1) 6= a+ b+ c | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]+
Pr
x,B





[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 0 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abcd]+
Pr
x,B
[|{j2, j3} ∩B|mod 2 = 1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B;
















Let us now consider the error conditioned on Z: For simplicity, define,
ErrQ,Z,k , Prx,B[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;Z; |B ∩ Q̂| = k]. We






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;Z; |B ∩ Q̂| = k;
(C(x) +B)Q = abcd]·
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abcd | A queries Q;Z; |B ∩ Q̂| = k]
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For simplicity, let us define (when d = a):
qQ,Z,kabcd , Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abcd | A queries Q;Z; |B ∩ Q̂| = k]







[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 0 | A queries Q;Z;





[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 1 | A queries Q;Z;
|B ∩ Q̂| = k; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]qQ,Z,kabcd
The event Z ∩ |B ∩ Q̂| = k does not depend on the internal randomness






























The vectors aj1 , aj2 , and aj3 are linearly independent since none of j1,
j2, or j3 are in R1 ∪ M̂1 and e1 ∈ span {aj1 , aj2 , aj3}. Since, also, x is
uniformly random, Fact 5.1.2 shows that (C(x) + B)j1 , (C(x) + B)j2 ,
and (C(x) + B)j3 are three independent, uniformly random bits. Thus,
∀k, a, b, c, d = a: qQ,kabcd = 18 . So, when k is even,
ErrQ,Z,k =
(
(1− pQ0000) + (1− p
Q
0110) + (1− p
Q























(1− pQ1001) + (1− p
Q
0100) + (1− p
Q






By Lemma 5.2.2, the probability that no bits were corrupted is at least
(1 − β)4 − 16
γm
. Fact 7.2 shows that the probability that exactly one of
j1, j2, and j3 was corrupted (with j1 and j4 being either both corrupted
or both not corrupted) is at least 2β(1−β)3 +β2(1−β)2− 7
γm
. Fact 7.3
shows that the probability that exactly two of j1, j2, and j3 was corrupted
(with j1 and j4 being either both corrupted or both not corrupted) is at
least 2β2(1 − β)2 + β3(1 − β) − 6
γm
. By Lemma 5.2.2, the probability
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[|B ∩ Q̂| = 0 | Z]+ Pr
B









[|B ∩ Q̂| = 1 | Z]+ Pr
B





β(1− β)3 + β2(1− β)2 + β4 − 46
m
Combining everything, we find
ErrQ = Pr
x,B







[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;Z; |B ∩ Q̂| = k]·
Pr
B




















> β(1− β) + 2β(1− β)3 + β2(1− β)2 + β4 − 50
m
+(
(1− β)4 + 2β2(1− β)2 + β3(1− β)− 2β(1− β)3−




Because β ≤ 1
2
,
ErrQ ≥ β(1− β) + 2β(1− β)3 + β2(1− β)2 + β4 −
50
m
= β − β2 + 2β − 6β2 + 6β3 − 2β4 + β2 − 2β3 + β4 + β4 − 50
m
= 3β − 6β2 + 4β3 − 50
m
≥ 3β(1− β)2 + β3 − 50
m
• |Q| = 4 and e1 ∈ span {aj1 , aj2 , aj3 , aj4}; but e1 is not in the span of any







[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩Q| = k]·
Pr
B






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩Q| = k]·
Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = k]
Note that for any Q and 0 ≤ k ≤ 4, the events A queries Q and |B ∩Q|
= k are independent. So for any Q and 0 ≤ k ≤ 4, Pr[A queries Q; |B ∩
Q| = k] > 0. Thus, above we are conditioning on events with nonzero
probability. The second equality above also holds because of the in-
dependence of A queries Q and |B ∩ Q| = k. For simplicity, define,
ErrQ,k , Prx,B[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ Q| = k]. We can
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[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩Q| = k; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]

















[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 1 | A queries Q; |B ∩Q| = k; (C(x) +B)Q = abcd]
The event |B ∩ Q| = k does not depend on the internal randomness of






























No two bits are equal, because otherwise, either the third or the fourth
one would be in M̂1, and that would violate our assumption on A. No
set of three bits sum to zero, because otherwise, the fourth one would
be in R1, which would also violate our assumption on A. And since the
sum of the four bits is e1, the bits are linearly independent. Since, also,
x is uniformly random, Fact 5.1.2 shows that (C(x)+B)j1 , (C(x)+B)j2 ,
(C(x) +B)j3 , and (C(x) +B)j4 are four independent, uniformly random
bits. We will use this fact in each of the probability calculations below.










(1− pQ1100) + (1− p
Q
0110) + (1− p
Q










(1− pQ0101) + (1− p
Q
1001) + (1− p
Q










(1− pQ0001) + (1− p
Q
0010) + (1− p
Q










(1− pQ1110) + (1− p
Q
1101) + (1− p
Q













By Lemma 5.2.2, we know the following two things:
Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = 0] + Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = 2] + Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = 4]
≥ (1− β)4 − 16
γm
+ 6β2(1− β)2 − 16
γm




[|B ∩Q| = 1] + Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = 3]
≥ 4β(1− β)3 − 16
γm
+ 4β3(1− β)− 16
γm
Combining everything, we find
ErrQ ≥
(










(1− β)4 + 6β2(1− β)2 + β4 − 96
m
,





(1− β)4 + 6β2(1− β)2 + β4,




Because β ≤ 1
2





Since for all Q, ErrQ ≥ 3β(1 − β)2 + β3 − 96m , Prx,B[A
C(x)+B(1) 6=
x1] ≥ 3β(1 − β)2 + β3 − 96m . Thus, there exists an x and B such that
Pr[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1] ≥ 3β(1 − β)2 + β3 − 96m , where the probability is only
over the internal coin flips of A.




). When β = δ−α−ν
γ
, first note that
the expression 3β(1 − β)2 + β3 is strictly increasing in β. Therefore, we can
lower bound 3β(1−β)2+β3− 96
m








































































The lower bound of Katz and Trevisan [32] implies that m > n, for
large enough n. Therefore, this expression is more than 1
2
− ε. (It is appar-
ent now that the choice of α at the start of the proof was made so that ξ =
δ − α− ν − (96
n
)1/3 would be the solution to 3ξ(1− ξ)2 + ξ3 = 1
2
− ε.)
When β = 1
2








− ε for large enough
n (again, note that m > n).
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So, we have shown there is a situation in which the error is more than
1
2
−ε. But this contradicts the fact that the recovery algorithm achieves (4, δ, ε)
on C.
Here are technical facts used in the above theorem.














) > 2δ(1− δ)3 + δ2(1− δ)2 − 7
m
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) = (δm)!(m− δm)!
m!
(m− 4)!·( 2
(δm− 1)!(m− δm− 3)!
+
1




m(m− 1)(m− 2)(m− 3)
(
2δm(m− δm)(m− δm− 1)(m− δm− 2)+




m(m− 1)(m− 2)(m− 3)
·(





















2(1− δ)2 + δ(1− δ)− 7
m
)
≥ 2δ(1− δ)3 + δ2(1− δ)2 − 7
m














) > δ2(1− δ)2 + 2δ3(1− δ)− 6
m
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) = (δm)!(m− δm)!
m!
(m− 4)!·( 1
(δm− 2)!(m− δm− 2)!
+
2




m(m− 1)(m− 2)(m− 3)
(
δm(δm− 1)(m− δm)(m− δm− 1)+




m(m− 1)(m− 2)(m− 3)
(




m(m− 1)(m− 2)(m− 3)
(




m(m− 1)(m− 2)(m− 3)
·(




m(m− 1)(m− 2)(m− 3)
(




δ(1− δ) + 2δ2 − 6
m
)




Arbitrary Number of Queries for Special
Classes of Decoders
In this chapter, we present extensions and adaptations of the methods
of the previous chapter. We will make statements on the lengths of codes which
have algorithms that can query any number of queries (potentially many more
than three), but which must operate under certain commonly used restrictions.
As in the previous chapter, we are requiring the algorithms we study to have
high correctness. We can also make statements on the correctness of these
codes, regardless of length.
Theorem 8.1 Let C : F n → Fm be a binary or linear code. Let A be a linear
decoder operating on C achieving correctness 1|F | + ε ≥ 1 − 3δ(1 − δ)
2 − (1 −
1
|F |−1)3δ
2(1 − δ) − (1 − 1|F |−1 +
1
(|F |−1)2 )δ
3 + O( 1
n1/3
) for some ε and δ. Then
m ≥ 2poly(n), where the exact form of the exponent depends on the value of
3δ(1− δ)2 + (1− 1|F |−1)3δ
2(1− δ) + (1− 1|F |−1 +
1
(|F |−1)2 )δ




and whether we can assume C is binary or linear.
Proof: This follows from using the three query length lower bounds: specif-
ically either Theorem 6.2.2 if C is binary or Theorem 6.3.2 if C is linear. Con-
sider the case in the proof of that respective theorem where |Q| = 3 and e1 is
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in the span of the vectors representing the positions in Q. The only additional
property of Q used was that the vectors representing the positions in Q sum
to e1. We have assumed this in this theorem’s statement. Therefore, the same
error bound holds in this proof.
It remains to note that, for linear decoders operating on a codeword
corrupted in the way specified in the three query length lower bound proofs,
the error when |Q| > 3 is greater than or equal the error when |Q| = 3.
For a matching sum decoder, we can say more:
Theorem 8.2 Let C : F n → Fm be a binary or linear code. Let A be a
matching sum decoder operating on C achieving correctness 1|F | + ε ≥ 1− 3δ+
O( 1
n1/3
) for some ε and δ. Then m ≥ 2poly(n), where the exact form of the
exponent depends on the value of 3δ− |F |−1|F | + ε−O(
1
n1/3
) and whether we can
assume C is binary and/or linear.
Proof: Let α < δ − ν + ε
3
− |F |−1
3|F | . As in the other length lower bound
proofs, this comes into play both when utilizing the combinatorial lemma and
in the final error calculation.
If |S2| is large, then we can use the respective combinatorial lemma
(Theorem 6.1.1 if C is binary and linear, Theorem 6.2.1 if C is binary but not
linear, or Theorem 6.3.1 if C is linear but not binary), to conclude m ≥ 2poly(n).
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Otherwise, S̄1∩ S̄2 is nonempty. We construct a distribution for the adversary
that corrupts the members of R1 and M1 in the same way as is done in the
binary or linear length lower bound proofs. For T , [m] \ (R1∪M1), however,
the adversary behaves differently. It finds all the (non-intersecting) sets of T
which A queries with nonzero probability. Because each such query set has size
at least 3, and the decoder works with matchings, there are at most m/3 query
sets. The adversary takes a node cover of these query sets and, uniformly at
random, corrupts (δ−α−ν)m of these vertices. Thus, the algorithm errs with
probability at least (δ−α−ν)m
m/3
= 3(δ − α− ν) > |F |−1|F | − ε.
There are related correctness bounds to these length lower bounds for
linear decoders and matching sum decoders. Please see the ”Linear Decoders”
section for more.
Here we introduce another definition that will lead to a reasonable
restriction we can apply on algorithms.
Definition 8.1 For a linear code, an INDEPENDENT QUERY SET is a
set of positions of the code such that the corresponding vectors are linearly
independent.
As part of our analysis on algorithms that query only independent query
sets, first we will present a correctness bound on such algorithms and then we
present a length lower bound on codes restricted to using them. The proofs of
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both of these theorems are based on the proof of the three query linear codes
length lower bound (Theorem 6.3.2).
Claim 8.3 Let C : F n → Fm be a linear code. Let A be an algorithm operating
on C which only queries independent query sets, such that the correct value of
xi is always spanned by q positions with non-zero coefficients. Then, ζδ(A) ≤
1− qδ + o(δ) +O( 1
n
).
Proof: Consider an adversary that chooses a set B ⊂ [m] with |B| = δm
uniformly at random from all sets having that size. The adversary will cor-
rupt C(x) by adding an independent, uniformly random member of F ∗ in the
positions present in B.
Consider the case where |Q| = q and e1 is in the span of the vectors
representing the positions in Q. e1 is not in the span of the vectors of any
strict subset of Q, because the vectors corresponding to the positions in Q are
linearly independent. Following the steps in the three query linear length lower
bound proof where we assume q = 3, we see by exactly the same reasoning
that, in our case, Prx,B[A
C(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q] ≥ 1−qδ+o(δ)+O( 1n).
It remains to note that, for algorithms that query only independent
query sets operating on a codeword corrupted in the way specified above, the
error when |Q| > q is greater than or equal the error when |Q| = q.
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Theorem 8.4 Let C : F n → Fm be a linear code. Let A be an algorithm
operating on C which only queries independent query sets. If, for a given δ
fraction codeword corruption, A achieves correctness 1|F |+ε, then m ≥ 2
.45αn−1
where α , δ + ε1/3(1− 1|F |)
2/3 + 1|F | − 1− (
108|F |
n
)1/3 − ν, where ν , 10
n
.
Note: α > 0 when 1|F | + ε > 1 − 3δ(1 − δ)
2 − (1 − 1|F |−1)3δ





3 + φ(n) with φ(n) = (108|F |
n
)1/3 + ν.
Proof: This follows from using the proof of the three query linear code
length lower bound (Theorem 6.3.2). Most of that proof actually holds for all
query sizes. In fact, the error bound (6.1) is stated for arbitrary independent
query sets Q. The only part of the proof that requires |Q| ≤ 3 is to guarantee




In this chapter, we present several correctness bounds that hold for
algorithms with any number of queries. We appear to be among the first ones
to investigate the trade off between the correctness of an LDC and the number
of queries an LDC is allowed to make.
9.1 Linear Algebra Property
In this section, we prove a theorem that is key to improving the above
correctness bound when a code is binary and linear. It in fact depends little
on our particular set up and can be viewed as a linear algebra property.
Recall that we think of the aj’s as column vectors of length n. So
(a1a2...aq) is an n by q matrix, and in what follows, z ·(a1a2...aq) for z ∈ {0, 1}n
represents the multiplication of a length n vector by a n by q matrix. Similarly,
(e1a1a2...ar−1) · w for w ∈ {0, 1}r represents the multiplication of an n by r
matrix by a length r vector.
Theorem 9.1.1 Let a1, a2, ... aq be non-zero vectors in {0, 1}n. Assume none
of them are e1 but, collectively, they span e1. Then there exists a v ∈ {0, 1}n−1
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such that the bit string (1v) · (a1a2...aq) has at most q2 ones in it.
Proof: Note that the conditions of the statement of the theorem imply
that the rank of a1, a2, ... aq, call it r, is at least 2. Since these vectors span
e1, we can, without loss of generality, relabel the indices on the a’s so that {e1,
a1, a2, ... ar−1} forms a basis. For w ∈ {0, 1}r, let
tw ,
∣∣∣{j ∈ [q] | aj = (e1a1a2...ar−1) · w}∣∣∣
Thus tw is the multiplicity with which (e1a1a2...ar−1) ·w appears within











The following claim will help us.
Claim 9.1 Fix b ∈ {0, 1}r−1. For all v ∈ {0, 1}n−1 such that
(1v) · (e1a1a2...ar−1) = 1b, the bit string (1v) · (a1a2...aq) has Nb ones in it.
Proof: Let j ∈ [q] and aj = (e1a1a2...ar−1) · w for a w ∈ {0, 1}r. This
implies < aj, 1v > = < (e1a1a2...ar−1) ·w, 1v > = < (1v) · (e1a1a2...ar−1), w >
= < 1b, w >.
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2r−2tw see below (9.1)
= 2r−2q
Line (9.1) holds because, for any nonzero vector z ∈ {0, 1}r−1, exactly
half of b ∈ {0, 1}r−1 have b · z = 1.
We were summing over 2r−1 Nb’s. Therefore, there is at least one b for






Because e1, a1, a2, ... ar−1 are linearly independent, for any vector
b′ ∈ {0, 1}r−1, there exists a vector v ∈ {0, 1}n−1 such that
(e1a1a2...ar−1) · (1v) = 1b′





9.2 q Query, Binary, Linear LDCs
The following proof for binary, linear LDCs is similar to the proof of
Theorem 9.5.1. But we get an improvement by utilizing Theorem 9.1.1.
Theorem 9.2.1 Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a linear code, and let A be a q
query recovery algorithm for it. Then, for large enough n,





δdq/4e+1(1− δ)bq/4c + 5 ∗ 2
q−1q2
n
Note: We will actually prove the stronger, but more complicated, bound:





δdq/4+1/2e(1− δ)bq/4−1/2c + 5 ∗ 2
q−1q2
n
Proof: By Claim 2.2, there exists a code C’ with no codeword position
identically zero and an algorithm A′ operating on it such that, for any δ,
ζδ(A) ≤ ζδ(A′). In this proof, we will henceforth work exclusively with C’ and
A′, but, for simplicity, drop the primes from notation.
For i ∈ [n], define:
Ri ,
{
j ∈ [m] | C(x)j = xi
}
So there exists at least one i such that |Ri| ≤ mn . Without loss of gener-
ality, assume |R1| ≤ mn . Consider what happens when the recovery algorithm
is tasked to find x1.
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. Note that if δ ≥ 1
2
, Claim
4.1 already gives the result. So we can assume δ ≤ 1
2
, and therefore β ≤ 1
2
.
Let us consider the probability of error of the decoder over uniformly random
x ∈ {0, 1}n, uniformly random B1 ⊂ [m] \ R1 such that |B1| = βγm, uni-
formly random B2 ⊆ R1, and the internal randomness of A. (For emphasis,
the adversary chooses B1 to always have the same size; but, for B2, it chooses
whether to include each member of R1 independently.) For convenience, de-
fine B , B1 ∪ B2. Let C(x) + B denote the codeword for x, corrupted in
the positions determined by B. Note that |B| ≤ δm always. We also note
that, because the argument below works for arbitrary algorithms, without loss
of generality, we can assume the algorithm always queries q positions. If the
algorithm ever queried fewer than q positions, have it query more and ignore
the additional values obtained. Because of Lemma 5.2.1, we can, without loss
of generality, assume that A never queries R1.
A property of B that we will use later is that, for all query sets Q of size
q, value r ∈ {0, 1}, and string s ∈ {0, 1}q, Prx,B[(C(x)+B)Q = s | x1 = r] > 0.
This is because B is independent of x. Since all of these probabilities are pos-
itive, we will be able to condition on these events properly. Note that proba-
bility expressions involving A are also implicitly over the internal randomness
of A.
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For Q and r ∈ {0, 1} having Prx[A queries Q;x1 = r] > 0, define
ErrQ,r , Prx,B[AC(x)+B(1) 6= r | A queries Q;x1 = r]. Noting that the distri-
butions of x and the internal randomness of A are independent, we decompose:
Pr
x,B














(ErrQ,0 + ErrQ,1) Pr[A queries Q]







[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 0 | A queries Q;x1 = 0; (C(x) +B)Q = s]·
Pr
x,B






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 1 | A queries Q;x1 = 1; (C(x) +B)Q = s]·
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | A queries Q;x1 = 1]
The value of x1 does not depend on the internal randomness of A.









[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 0 | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = s]·
Pr
x,B






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 1 | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = s]·
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | A queries Q;x1 = 1]
For ease of notation, let us make the following definition.
pQs , Pr
x,B






(1− pQs ) Pr
x,B






[(C(x) +B)Q = s | A queries Q;x1 = 1]
The internal randomness of A is independent of B, and the values of
the positions labeled by Q are independent of whether the algorithm actually
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queries Q. So we have
ErrQ,0 + ErrQ,1 =
∑
s∈{0,1}q
(1− pQs ) Pr
x,B




















[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]−
Pr
x,B









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]−
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]
)
This expression is smallest when pQs is 0 for s such that Pr[(C(x) +
B)Q = s | x1 = 1] > Pr[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0] and pQs is 1 for s such that
Pr[(C(x) + B)Q = s | x1 = 1] < Pr[(C(x) + B)Q = s | x1 = 0]. Thus the last








[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]−
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]
)
where, to save space, we have used shorthand notation for specifying





[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]− Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]
)
=









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]−
Pr
x,B








[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]−
Pr
x,B









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]−
Pr
x,B









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]−
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]
∣∣∣
Plugging this in above,







[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]− Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]
∣∣∣
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[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]− Pr
x,B









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x = 1w] Pr
x






[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x = 0w] Pr
x


















































By Theorem 9.1.1, we can choose a v ∈ {0, 1}n for which C(1v)Q has
weight at most q
2
. Note that by the reductions we have made, no position in
Q always equals zero or always equals x1. We will see the importance of this
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[BQ = s]− Pr
B
[BQ = s+ C(1v)Q]







[BQ = s]− Pr
B
[BQ = s+ C(1v)Q]
∣∣∣
Now will be the first time we use a fact about the distribution of B,
excluding when we used that B is independent of A. For a given s, PrB[BQ = s]
is a function of only the number of 1’s in s. Let C(1v)Q have a ≤ q2 1’s. Also,
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let b be the number of positions where C(1v)Q and s both equal 1; and let c
be number of positions where C(1v)Q equals 0 but s equals 1. Therefore, by

























































must hold for A to have nontrivial correctness. Hence δ < 1− δ
and β < 1−β. Therefore, the expression inside of the absolute value is positive
if and only if b < a
2
. Also note that the value of the expression inside of the
absolute value, for a given b, has the opposite sign of that same expression







































































βd(q/2+1)/2e(1− β)b(q/2−1)/2c + 3 ∗ 2
qq2
m
Note that for large δ and thus β, stronger upper bounds than the ones































)dq/4+1/2e(1− (δ − 1
n




























(δdq/4+1/2e(1− δ)bq/4−1/2c − q
n








(δdq/4+1/2e(1− δ)bq/4−1/2c − q
n
)− 3 ∗ 2
q−1q2
m
The lower bound of Katz and Trevisan [32] implies that m > n, for







for q > 1, the
result is obtained.
9.3 Probabilistic Method for the Non-Linear Case
The following theorem is a non-linear analog of the linear algebra prop-
erty we proved earlier for linear codes (Theorem 9.1.1).
Theorem 9.3.1 Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a code, and let Q be a size q
query set an algorithm A queries. Also assume that for every position j ∈ [m],
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Proof: To make things compact, define a , Prw∈{0,1}n−1 [C(1w)j = 1] and







































































































For a given 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, the expression 2ab is increasing in b. This means
that the maximum of 2ab such that 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1 and |a+ b− 1| ≤ t equals the
maximum of 2ab such that 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1 and a+ b− 1 = t. This is the same as










≤ q((1 + t)
2
2







Because t ≤ 1, the result follows.
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We will actually need a statement similar to the last theorem, but under
a slightly different probability distribution. The following claim provides what
we need.
Claim 9.3.2 Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a code, and let Q be a size q query
set an algorithm A queries. Also assume that for every position j ∈ [m],
|Prx∈{0,1}n [x1 = C(x)j] − Prx∈{0,1}n [x1 6= C(x)j]| ≤ t. Consider two sets of
vectors: the set of vectors in {0, 1}n with first bit 0 and the set of vectors in















(v, v + u) | v ∈ {0, 1}n−1
}
The key property we use about this family is that it is a partition of the
set {(w1, w2) | w1, w2 ∈ {0, 1}n−1}. If we consider a probability distribution
in which u is drawn uniformly at random from {0, 1}n−1 and then (w1, w2) is

















+ 3t) by Theorem 9.3.1
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9.4 q Query, Binary, Possibly Non-Linear LDCs
Now we present a correctness theorem for binary (possibly non-linear)
codes.
Theorem 9.4.1 Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a code, and let A be a q query



















+ (q + 1)ν














∣∣∣ |Ri| ≥ νm}
Clearly |S|νm ≤
∑
i∈[n] |Ri|. So there exists a j ∈ [m] belonging to















= .99n < n. So S̄ contains at least
one i. Without loss of generality, 1 ∈ S̄. That is, |R1| < νm. Consider what
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happens when the recovery algorithm is tasked to find x1.
Because the argument below works for arbitrary algorithms, without
loss of generality, we can assume the algorithm always queries exactly q posi-
tions. If the algorithm ever queried fewer than q positions, have it query more
and ignore the additional values obtained.
Define γ , |[m]\R1|
m
and β , δ−ν
γ
. Let us consider the probability of
error of the decoder over uniformly random x ∈ {0, 1}n, uniformly random
B1 ⊂ [m] \ R1 such that |B1| = βγm, uniformly random B2 ⊆ R1, and the
internal randomness of A. (For emphasis, the adversary chooses B1 to always
have the same size; but, for B2, it chooses whether to include each member of
R1 independently.) For convenience, define B , B1∪B2. Let C(x)+B denote
the codeword for x, corrupted in the positions determined by B. Note that
|B| ≤ δm always. Because of Lemma 5.2.1, we can, without loss of generality,
assume that A never queries R1.
A property of B that we will use later is that, for all query sets Q of size
q, value r ∈ {0, 1}, and string s ∈ {0, 1}q, Prx,B[(C(x)+B)Q = s | x1 = r] > 0.
This is because B is independent of x. Since all of these probabilities are pos-
itive, we will be able to condition on these events properly. Note that proba-
bility expressions involving A are also implicitly over the internal randomness
of A.
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For Q and r ∈ {0, 1} having Prx[A queries Q;x1 = r] > 0, define
ErrQ,r , Prx,B[AC(x)+B(1) 6= r | A queries Q;x1 = r]. Noting that the distri-
butions of x and the internal randomness of A are independent, we decompose:
Pr
x,B














(ErrQ,0 + ErrQ,1) Pr[A queries Q]







[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 0 | A queries Q;x1 = 0; (C(x) +B)Q = s]·
Pr
x,B






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 1 | A queries Q;x1 = 1; (C(x) +B)Q = s]·
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | A queries Q;x1 = 1]
The value of x1 does not depend on the internal randomness of A.









[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 0 | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = s]·
Pr
x,B






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 1 | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = s]·
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | A queries Q;x1 = 1]
For ease of notation, let us make the following definition.
pQs , Pr
x,B






(1− pQs ) Pr
x,B






[(C(x) +B)Q = s | A queries Q;x1 = 1]
The internal randomness of A is independent of B, and the values of
the positions labeled by Q are independent of whether the algorithm actually
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queries Q. So we have
ErrQ,0 + ErrQ,1 =
∑
s∈{0,1}q
(1− pQs ) Pr
x,B




















[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]−
Pr
x,B









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]−
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]
)
This expression is smallest when pQs is 0 for s such that Pr[(C(x) +
B)Q = s | x1 = 1] > Pr[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0] and pQs is 1 for s such that
Pr[(C(x) + B)Q = s | x1 = 1] < Pr[(C(x) + B)Q = s | x1 = 0]. Thus the last








[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]−
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]
)
where, to save space, we have used shorthand notation for specifying





[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]− Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]
)
=









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]−
Pr
x,B








[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]−
Pr
x,B









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]−
Pr
x,B









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]−
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]
∣∣∣
Plugging this in above,







[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]− Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]
∣∣∣
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[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 1]− Pr
x,B









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x = 1w] Pr
x






[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x = 0w] Pr
x


















































At this point we apply Claim 9.3.2 to find a special matchingM between
the set of vectors in {0, 1}n with first bit 0 and the set of vectors in {0, 1}n
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[BQ = s]− Pr
B
[BQ = s+ C(1w1)Q −C(0w2)Q]
∣∣∣
s−C(1w1)Q relabeled s






[BQ = s]− Pr
B
[BQ = s+ C(1w1)Q −C(0w2)Q]
∣∣∣
For a given s, PrB[BQ = s] is a function of only the number of 1’s in
s. Let C(1w1)Q −C(0w2)Q have a(w1, w2) 1’s. To simplify notation, we will
temporarily refer to a(w1, w2) as a. Also, let b be the number of positions
where C(1w1)Q − C(0w2)Q and s both equal 1; and let c be the number of
positions where C(1w1)Q − C(0w2)Q equals 0 but s equals 1. Therefore, by



























































must hold for A to have nontrivial correctness. Hence δ < 1− δ
and β < 1−β. Therefore, the expression inside of the absolute value is positive
if and only if b < a
2
. Also note that the value of the expression inside of the
absolute value, for a given b, has the opposite sign of that same expression







































































βa/2+1(1− β)a/2 + 3 ∗ 2
qq2
m
Note that for large δ and thus β, stronger upper bounds than the ones
used in the last equation block could have been used instead. The last line
holds because, for n large enough, the ratio between the central binomial
coefficient and the binomial coefficient whose lower register is one less is less










. Combining these facts gives
∆w1,w2 < 2− 3.96
2a√
2a
βa/2+1(1− β)a/2 + 3 ∗ 2
qq2
m
= 2− 3.96 β√
2a
(4β(1− β))a/2 + 3 ∗ 2
qq2
m
It is clear that ∆ = 1
2n−1
∑
(w1,w2)∈M ∆w1,w2 . Fact 9.4.2 shows that
the function φ(a) = 1√
2a




(w1,w2)∈M a(w1, w2) ≤ q(
1
2
+ 3t). Jensen’s inequality states that, for a
convex function f , the average of f applied to two different inputs is greater
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than f applied to the average of those inputs. Thus,






























− 3 ∗ 2
qq2
m
Remember that β = δ−ν
γ

























ated at β̂ = δ − ν. Thus, we have








− 3 ∗ 2
qq2
m
≥ 1.98 δ − ν√
q(1 + 6t)
(




− 3 ∗ 2
qq2
m

















− (2q + 2)ν − 3 ∗ 2
qq2
m
The final result is obtained by utilizing the lower bound of Katz and
Trevisan [32]. This implies, for large enough n, m > n.
Fact 9.4.2 Given that β < 1
2










where b , a/2 and
γ , 4β(1− β) < 1.

















Because log γ < 0, γ > 0, and b > 0, each term of the last line is
positive. So the last line as a whole is positive. Also note that these first and
second derivatives are continuous over the domain of positive b. So χ(b) is
convex. Because the derivative of b with respect to a is 1
2
> 0, then, by the
chain rule, φ(a) is convex as well.
9.5 q Query, Possibly Non-Linear LDCs Over Any Field
Theorem 9.5.1 Let C: Σn → Σm be a code, and let A be a q query recovery
algorithm for it. Then, for large enough m,










)d(q+1)/2e(1− δ)b(q−1)/2c + 2
qq2
m
Proof: Without loss of generality, let Σ = {0, 1, ...|Σ| − 1}. We will use
modular arithmetic (modulo |Σ|) on Σ. Also, define Σ̂ as the nonzero elements
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of Σ.
Without loss of generality, let x1 be the input bit A has been tasked to
find.
Let x be drawn uniformly at random from Σn. The adversary will
choose B ⊂ [m] uniformly at random from all subsets of [m] having size δm.
The adversary will corrupt each position in B by adding to it a value from Σ̂
uniformly at random. A property of B that we use later is, for all query sets Q
of size q, value r ∈ Σ, and string s ∈ Σq, Prx,B[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = r] > 0.
This is because B is independent of x. Since all of these probabilities are
positive, we will be able to condition on these events properly.
For Q and r ∈ Σ having Prx[A queries Q;x1 = r] > 0, define ErrQ,r ,
Prx,B[A
C(x)+B(1) 6= r | A queries Q;x1 = r]. Noting that the distributions of
x and the internal randomness of A are independent, we decompose:
Pr
x,B















ErrQ,t Pr[A queries Q]
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[AC(x)+B(1) 6= r | A queries Q;x1 = r; (C(x) +B)Q = s]·
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | A queries Q;x1 = r]
The value of x1 does not depend on the internal randomness of A.










[AC(x)+B(1) 6= r | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = s]·
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | A queries Q;x1 = r]
For ease of notation, let us make the following definition.
pQs (r) , Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = r | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = s]





































[(C(x) +B)Q = s | A queries Q;x1 = r]
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The internal randomness of A is independent of B, and the values of
the positions labeled by Q are independent of whether the algorithm actually














(1− pQs (r)) Pr
x,B

















[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]−
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = r]
))









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]−
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = r]
)
This expression is smallest when pQs (r) is 0 for s such that Pr[(C(x) +
B)Q = s | x1 = 0] > Pr[(C(x) + B)Q = s | x1 = r] and pQs (r) is 1 for s such
that Pr[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0] < Pr[(C(x) + B)Q = s | x1 = r]. Thus the
last expression is lower bounded by









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]
− Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = r]
)
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where, to save space, we have used shorthand notation for specifying






[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]− Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = r]
)
=








[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]−
Pr
x,B








[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = r]−
Pr
x,B









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]−
Pr
x,B









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = r]−
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]
∣∣∣
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Plugging this in above,∑
r∈Σ









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = r]−
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = 0]
∣∣∣






[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x1 = r]− Pr
x,B









[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x = rw] Pr
x




[(C(x) +B)Q = s | x = 0w] Pr
x




















































































[BQ = s]− Pr
B










[BQ = s]− Pr
B
[BQ = s+ C(rw)Q −C(0w)Q]
∣∣∣
Now will be the first time we use a fact about the distribution of B,
excluding when we used that B is independent of A. For a given s, PrB[BQ = s]
is a function of only the number of nonzero elements in s. Let C(rw)Q −
C(0w)Q have a nonzero elements. Also, let b be the number of positions
where C(rw)Q −C(0w)Q and s are both nonzero; and let c be the number of
positions where C(rw)Q − C(0w)Q equals 0 but s is nonzero. Therefore, by






































































)∣∣∣( δ|Σ| − 1)b(1− δ)a−b − ( δ|Σ| − 1)a−b(1− δ)b∣∣∣+ 3 ∗ 2qq2m
172
δ < 1|Σ| must hold for A to have nontrivial correctness. Hence
δ
|Σ|−1 <
1− δ. Therefore, the expression inside of the absolute value is positive if and
only if b < a
2
. Also note that the value of the expression inside of the absolute
value, for a given b, has the opposite sign of that same expression when b is


























b(1− δ)a−b = (1− δ + δ|Σ|−1)
a ≤ 1, the last line

































































)d(q+1)/2e(1− δ)b(q−1)/2c + 3 ∗ 2
qq2
m
Note that for large δ, stronger upper bounds than the ones used in the
last equation block could have been used instead.
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So, all the ∆r,w’s have this same upper bound. Therefore, we have∑
r∈Σ























− 3(|Σ| − 1)2
q−1q2
m
We note that, for binary codes, this correctness bound is tight up to
a constant factor. This can be seen by the following. Take the code with all
positions equalling x1. While algorithms querying this code cannot return any-
thing other than the first input position with probability greater than random
guessing, there is an algorithm that is very good at returning that first bit.
Specifically, for any q, there is a q query algorithm for this code that achieves
correctness






eq assuming δ ≤ 1
2
when tasked to recover input position 1. This algorithm queries q
random positions and takes the majority vote of the answers it receives. See
the proof of Theorem 12.2 for a derivation of the bound.
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Chapter 10
Precise Bounds on Correctness for Two and
Three Query LDCs
The correctness bounds in the last chapter are interesting for large q,
but they are not tight for small q. To address this, this section provides several
correctness bounds on the performance of algorithms allowing just two or three
queries.
10.1 Two Query, Binary, Linear LDCs
Claim 10.1 Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a linear code. For any two query




Proof: By Claim 2.2, there exists a code C’ with no codeword position
identically zero and an algorithm A′ operating on it such that, for any δ,
ζδ(A) ≤ ζδ(A′). In this proof, we will henceforth work exclusively with C’ and
A′, but, for simplicity, drop the primes from notation.
For i ∈ [n], define:
Ri ,
{
j ∈ [m] | C(x)j = xi
}
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So there exists at least one i such that |Ri| ≤ mn . Without loss of gener-
ality, assume |R1| ≤ mn . Consider what happens when the recovery algorithm
is tasked to find x1. Recall the notation we defined earlier, applicable because
C is linear: for j ∈ [m], aj ∈ {0, 1}n is the vector satisfying ∀x ∈ {0, 1}n,
Cj(x) = aj · x. Using this, define
S ,
{
j ∈ [m] | (aj)1 6= 0
}
Define T as whichever of S and S̄ (the complement of S) has smaller
size. If they have the same size, T can be either set. Clearly |T | ≤ m
2
.
Define γ , |T |
m






). Let us consider the probability
of error of the decoder over uniformly random x ∈ {0, 1}n, uniformly random
B1 ⊂ T such that |B1| = βγm, uniformly random B2 ⊆ R1, and the internal
randomness of A. (For emphasis, the adversary chooses B1 to always have
the same size; but, for B2, it chooses whether to include each member of R1
independently.) For convenience, define B , B1 ∪ B2. Let C(x) + B denote
the codeword for x, corrupted in the positions determined by B. Note that
|B| ≤ δm always. We also note that, because the argument below works for
arbitrary algorithms, without loss of generality, we can assume the algorithm
always queries two positions. If the algorithm ever queried fewer than two
positions, have it query more and ignore the additional values obtained. Be-
cause of Lemma 5.2.1, we can, without loss of generality, assume that A never
queries R1.
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[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q] Pr[A queries Q]
Note that probability expressions involving A are also implicitly over
the internal randomness of A. Define ErrQ ,
Prx,B[A
C(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q]. We will bound ErrQ depending on all
the different possibilities for Q for which Pr[A queries Q] > 0. First we give
some notation.
Write Q = {j1, j2}. For Q and a, b ∈ {0, 1} such that
Prx,B[A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = ab] > 0, define
pQab , Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = 0 | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = ab]
For simplicity, let us define the following notation. For a given S ⊆ Q,
qQ,kab (S) , Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = ab | A queries Q; |B ∩ S| = k]
On an intuitive level, the cases below have similarities to each other,
but they use different S in their analyses. Here are the possibilities for Q:




ErrQ ≥ β as well.
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• e1 ∈ span {aj1 , aj2}: Exactly one bit of Q must be in T – assume it is j1.






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ {j1}| = k]·
Pr
B






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ {j1}| = k]·
Pr
B
[|B ∩ {j1}| = k]
Note that for any Q, j1 ∈ Q, and 0 ≤ k ≤ 1, the events A queries Q and
|B ∩ {j1}| = k are independent. So for any Q, j1 ∈ Q, and 0 ≤ k ≤ 1,
Pr[A queries Q; |B∩{j1}| = k] > 0. Thus, above we are conditioning on
events with nonzero probability. The second equality above also holds
because of the independence of A queries Q and |B ∩ {j1}| = k. For
simplicity, define, ErrQ,k , Prx,B[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ {j1}| = k;
(C(x) +B)Q = ab]·
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = ab | A queries Q; |B ∩ {j1}| = k]
Since neither bit is in R1 but e1 is in the span of both bits, the sum of
the two bits (when uncorrupted) is x1. (In this proof, additions involving


















[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ {j1}| = k; (C(x) +B)Q = ab]
The event |B ∩ {j1}| = k does not depend on the internal randomness



























The two query bits cannot be equal because one is in T and one is
not. Since neither is 0, they are linearly independent. Since, also, x is
uniformly random, Fact 5.1.2 shows that (C(x) +B)j1 and (C(x) +B)j2









10 + (1− p
Q









10 + (1− p
Q





other hand, in the k = 1 case,
ErrQ,1 =
(








/4 = 1− PQ
The probability that j1 was corrupted is β. Combining everything, we
find
ErrQ = (1− β)PQ + β(1− PQ) = β + (1− 2β)PQ
Because β ≤ 1
2
, ErrQ ≥ β.
Since for all Q, ErrQ ≥ β, Prx,B[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1] ≥ β. Thus, there
exists an x and B such that Pr[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1] ≥ β (where the probability
is only over the internal coin flips of A). When β = 1
2









, and we know γ ≤ 1
2
. In this case β ≥ 2δ − 2
n
. Combining
these two possibilities gives the result.
10.2 Three Query, Binary, Linear LDCs
We can extend this proof for q = 3:
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Claim 10.2 Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a linear code with n large enough.
For any three query LDC recovery algorithm A:
ζδ(A) ≤
{








Proof: By Claim 2.2, there exists a code C’ with no codeword position
identically zero and an algorithm A′ operating on it such that, for any δ,
ζδ(A) ≤ ζδ(A′). In this proof, we will henceforth work exclusively with C’ and
A′, but, for simplicity, drop the primes from notation.
For i ∈ [n], define
Ri ,
{
j ∈ [m] | C(x)j = xi
}
So there exists at least one i such that |Ri| ≤ mn . Without loss of gener-
ality, assume |R1| ≤ mn . Consider what happens when the recovery algorithm
is tasked to find x1.











. Note that if δ ≥ 1
2
, Claim
4.1 already gives the result. So we can assume δ ≤ 1
2
, and therefore β ≤ 1
2
.
Let us consider the probability of error of the decoder over uniformly random
x ∈ {0, 1}n, uniformly random B1 ⊂ [m] \ R1 such that |B1| = βγm, uni-
formly random B2 ⊆ R1, and the internal randomness of A. (For emphasis,
the adversary chooses B1 to always have the same size; but, for B2, it chooses
181
whether to include each member of R1 independently.) For convenience, de-
fine B , B1 ∪ B2. Let C(x) + B denote the codeword for x, corrupted in the
positions determined by B. Note that |B| ≤ δm always. We also note that,
because the argument below works for arbitrary algorithms, without loss of
generality, we can assume the algorithm always queries three positions. If the
algorithm ever queried fewer than three positions, have it query more and ig-
nore the additional values obtained. Because of Lemma 5.2.1, we can, without
loss of generality, assume that A never queries R1.









[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q] Pr[A queries Q]
Note that probability expressions involving A are also implicitly over
the internal randomness of A. Define ErrQ ,
Prx,B[A
C(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q]. We will bound ErrQ depending on all
the different possibilities for Q for which Pr[A queries Q] > 0. First we give
some notation.
Write Q = {j1, j2, j3}. For Q and a, b, c ∈ {0, 1} such that
Prx,B[A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abc] > 0, define
pQabc , Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = 0 | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
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For simplicity, let us define the following notation. For a given S ⊆ Q,
qQ,kabc (S) , Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abc | A queries Q; |B ∩ S| = k]
On an intuitive level, the cases below have similarities to each other,
but they use different S in their analyses. Here are the possibilities for Q:




ErrQ ≥ 2β(1− β) as well.
• e1 ∈ span {aj1 , aj2 , aj3}; but e1 is not in the span of any two of those






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩Q| = k]·
Pr
B






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩Q| = k]·
Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = k]
Note that for any Q and 0 ≤ k ≤ 3, the events A queries Q and |B ∩Q|
= k are independent. So for any Q and 0 ≤ k ≤ 3, Pr[A queries Q; |B ∩
Q| = k] > 0. Thus, above we are conditioning on events with nonzero
probability. The second equality above also holds because of the in-
dependence of A queries Q and |B ∩ Q| = k. For simplicity, define,
ErrQ,k , Prx,B[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ Q| = k]. We can
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[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩Q| = k; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
The sum of the three bits (when uncorrupted) is x1. (In this proof,
additions involving codeword bits are implicitly modulo 2.) So a+ b+ c
















[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 1 | A queries Q; |B ∩Q| = k; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
The event |B ∩ Q| = k does not depend on the internal randomness of
































No two bits are equal, because otherwise, the third one would be in
R1, and that would violate our assumption on A. Since the sum of
the three bits is e1, the bits are linearly independent. Since, also, x is
uniformly random, Fact 5.1.2 shows that (C(x) + B)j1 , (C(x) + B)j2 ,
and (C(x) + B)j3 are three independent, uniformly random bits. Thus,
∀k, a, b, c: qQ,kabc (Q) = 18 . So, in the even k case,
ErrQ,0 = ErrQ,2 =
(
(1− pQ000) + (1− p
Q
011) + (1− p
Q












For simplicity, call PQ , ErrQ,0. In the odd k case,









(1− pQ100) + (1− p
Q
010) + (1− p
Q







By Lemma 5.2.2, we know the following two things:
Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = 0] + Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = 2]
≥ (1− β)3 − 9
γm
+ 3β2(1− β)− 9
γm
≥ (1− β)3 + 3β2(1− β)− 18
γm




[|B ∩Q| = 1] + Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = 3]
≥ 3β(1− β)2 − 9
γm
+ β3 − 9
γm
≥ 3β(1− β)2 + β3 − 36
m
Combining everything, we find
ErrQ ≥
(








= 3β(1− β)2 + β3 − 36
m
+(
(1− β)3 + 3β2(1− β)− 3β(1− β)2 − β3
)
PQ







Because β ≤ 1
2




• e1 is in the span of two of the vectors representing the bits, say aj1 and








[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k]·
Pr
B






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k]·
Pr
B
[|B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k]
Note that for any Q, j1, j2 ∈ Q, and 0 ≤ k ≤ 2, the events A queries Q
and |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k are independent. So for any Q, j1, j2 ∈ Q, and
0 ≤ k ≤ 2, Pr[A queries Q; |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k] > 0. Thus, above we
are conditioning on events with nonzero probability. The second equal-
ity above also holds because of the independence of A queries Q and
|B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k. For simplicity, define, ErrQ,k , Prx,B[AC(x)+B(1) 6=







[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k;
(C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abc | A queries Q; |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k]


















[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 1 | A queries Q; |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
The event |B∩{j1, j2}| = k does not depend on the internal randomness





























aj1 and aj2 cannot be equal because they sum to e1, and the sum of all
three bits cannot be zero because j3 is not in R1. Thus, aj1 , aj2 , and
aj3 are linearly independent. Since, also, x is uniformly random, Fact
5.1.2 shows that (C(x) +B)j1 , (C(x) +B)j2 , and (C(x) +B)j3 are three
188
independent, uniformly random bits. Thus, ∀k, a, b, c: qQ,kabc ({j1, j2}) =
1
8




(1− pQ000) + (1− p
Q
001) + (1− p
Q






















(1− pQ100) + (1− p
Q
101) + (1− p
Q






By Lemma 5.2.2, we know the following two things:
Pr
B
[|B ∩ {j1, j2}| = 0] + Pr
B
[|B ∩ {j1, j2}| = 2]
≥ (1− β)2 − 4
γm
+ β2 − 4
γm
≥ (1− β)2 + β2 − 8
γm




[|B ∩ {j1, j2}| = 1] ≥ 2β(1− β)−
4
γm
≥ 2β(1− β)− 8
m
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Combining everything, we find
ErrQ ≥
(











(1− β)2 + β2 − 16
m









Because β ≤ 1
2
, ErrQ ≥ 2β(1− β)− 16m .
• e1 is in the span of two of the vectors representing the bits, say aj1 and
aj2 , taken by themselves; and C(x)j3 is the same as one of the other bits
– assume it is C(x)j1 : Define Z as the event that either both j1 and j3




[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; Z̄] Pr
B
[Z̄ | A queries Q]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;Z] Pr
B
[Z | A queries Q]
= Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; Z̄] Pr
B




[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;Z; |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k]·
Pr
B





[Z | A queries Q]
Note that for any Q, the events A queries Q and Z are independent. So
for any Q, Pr[A queries Q;Z] > 0. Thus, above we are conditioning on
events with nonzero probability. For any Q and k, Pr[|B ∩ {j1, j2}| =
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k;A queries Q;Z] > 0, so we are not conditioning on zero probability
events after the second equality, either. Because the events Z and A
queries Q are independent, the expression above becomes
ErrQ = Pr
x,B






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;Z; |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k]·
Pr
B





Let us first consider the error conditioned on Z̄. For simplicity, define,
ErrQ,Z̄ , Prx,B[A






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; Z̄; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abc | A queries Q; Z̄]
For simplicity, let us define:
qQ,Z̄abc , Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abc | A queries Q; Z̄]
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[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[j1 ∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j3 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[j3 ∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
)
qQ,Z̄abc
If A queries Q, Z̄, and (C(x) + B)Q = abc, over random x and B, then










[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q; Z̄; j3 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
)
Now, conditioning on whether j2 is corrupted or not, and using that a+b
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[AC(x)+B(1) 6= a+ b | A queries Q; Z̄; j1, j2 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[j2 ∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = a+ b | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B; j2 /∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[j2 /∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = a+ b | A queries Q; Z̄; j2, j3 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[j2 ∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; j3 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) 6= a+ b | A queries Q; Z̄; j2 /∈ B; j3 ∈ B;
(C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[j2 /∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; j3 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
)
qQ,Z̄abc
The events Z̄, j1 ∈ B, j2 ∈ B, and j3 ∈ B are each independent of the
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[AC(x)+B(1) 6= a+ b | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[j2 ∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = a+ b | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[j2 /∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = a+ b | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[j2 ∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; j3 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) 6= a+ b | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B






[j2 ∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
= Pr
x,B
[j2 ∈ B |Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
= Pr
x,B
[x1 = a+ b |Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
= Pr
x,B
[x1 = a+ b |Z̄; j3 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = cba]
= Pr
x,B
[x1 = c+ b |Z̄; j3 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
= Pr
x,B
[j2 ∈ B |Z̄; j3 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
= Pr
x,B
[j2 ∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; j3 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]
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Likewise, it is also true that
Pr
x,B
[j2 /∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc] =
Pr
x,B











[AC(x)+B(1) 6= a+ b | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[j2 ∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = a+ b | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[j2 /∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) = a+ b | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[j2 ∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]+
Pr
x,B
[AC(x)+B(1) 6= a+ b | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B











[AC(x)+B(1) 6= a+ b | A queries Q; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]+
Pr
x,B





[j2 ∈ B | A queries Q; Z̄; j1 ∈ B; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]+
Pr
x,B

















Let us now consider the error conditioned on Z. For simplicity, define,
ErrQ,Z,k , Prx,B[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;Z; |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k].






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;Z;
|B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k; (C(x) +B)Q = abc]·
Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abc | A queries Q;Z; |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k]
For simplicity, let us define:
qQ,Z,kabc , Pr
x,B
[(C(x) +B)Q = abc | A queries Q;Z; |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k]






[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 0 | A queries Q;Z; |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k;







[AC(x)+B(1) 6= 1 | A queries Q;Z; |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k;
(C(x) +B)Q = abc]q
Q,Z,k
abc
The event Z ∩ |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k does not depend on the internal ran-
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We said earlier that e1 is in the span of aj1 and aj2 . Neither aj1 nor
aj2 equal e1, so aj1 and aj2 are linearly independent. Since, also, x is
uniformly random, Fact 5.1.2 shows that (C(x) +B)j1 and (C(x) +B)j2
are two independent, uniformly random bits. Thus, ∀k, a, b, c = a: qQ,Z,kabc
= 1
4
. So, when k is even,
ErrQ,Z,k =
(















111 + (1− p
Q





This expression is 1−PQ. We will use these facts after briefly considering
another probability expression.
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[|B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k | A queries Q;Z] = Pr
B
[|B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k | Z]
By Lemma 5.2.2, we know the following two things:
Pr
B




[|B ∩ {j1, j2}| = 2 | Z] Pr
B
[Z]
≥ (1− β)3 − 9
γm
+ β3 − 9
γm




[|B ∩ {j1, j2}| = 1 | Z] Pr
B
[Z]
≥ β(1− β)2 + β2(1− β)− 9
γm
≥ β(1− β)− 18
m
Combining everything, we find
ErrQ = Pr
x,B







[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | A queries Q;Z; |B ∩ {j1, j2}| = k]·
Pr
B
































≥ β(1− β) + min
(





Because β ≤ 1
2
, ErrQ ≥ 2β(1− β)− 40m .
Since for all Q, ErrQ ≥ 2β(1 − β) − 40m , Prx,B[A
C(x)+B(1) 6= x1] ≥
2β(1 − β) − 40
m
. Thus, there exists an x and B such that Pr[AC(x)+B(1) 6=
x1] ≥ 2β(1− β)− 40m (where the probability is only over the internal coin flips
of A).




. First note that the expression 2β(1− β) is
strictly increasing for β ≤ 1
2
. Therefore, we can lower bound 2β(1 − β) − 40
m




with 2β̂(1− β̂)− 40
m
evaluated at (note: |R1| ≤ mn ) β̂













≥ 2δ(1− δ)− 46
n
The last line holds because the lower bound of Katz and Trevisan [32]
implies, for large enough n, m ≥ n.
10.3 Two Query, Binary, Possibly Non-Linear LDCs
Claim 10.3 Let C: {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a code with large enough n. Fix






. For any two query LDC recovery algorithm A,


















∣∣∣ |Ri| ≥ νm}
Clearly |S|νm ≤
∑
i∈[n] |Ri|. So there exists a j ∈ [m] belonging to















= .99n < n. So S̄ contains at least
one i. Without loss of generality, 1 ∈ S̄. That is, |R1| < νm. Consider what
happens when the recovery algorithm is tasked to find x1.
Because the argument below works for arbitrary algorithms, without
loss of generality, we can assume the algorithm always queries two positions.
If the algorithm ever queried fewer than two positions, have it query more and
ignore the additional values obtained.
Define γ , |[m]\R1|
m




). Let A be a q query algorithm
for C subjected to δ fraction of the codeword corrupted. Let us consider
the probability of error of the decoder over uniformly random x ∈ {0, 1}n,
uniformly random B1 ⊂ [m] \ R1 such that |B1| = βγm, uniformly random
B2 ⊆ R1, and the internal randomness of A. (For emphasis, the adversary
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chooses B1 to always have the same size; but, for B2, it chooses whether to in-
clude each member of R1 independently.) For convenience, define B , B1∪B2.
Let C(x)+B denote the codeword for x, corrupted in the positions determined
by B. Note that |B| ≤ δm always. Because of Lemma 5.2.1, we can, without
loss of generality, assume that A never queries R1.
Without loss of generality, we assume that A flips all of its random coins
first, and then, based on those random values, chooses a query set Q ⊂ [m] and
a deterministic function φ to apply on the two values it receives from querying
Q. Without loss of generality, Q = {1, 2}. We use the shorthand ”Q, φ” to









[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | Q, φ] Pr[Q, φ]
Define ErrQ,φ , Prx,B[AC(x)+B(1) 6= x1 | Q, φ]. We will bound ErrQ,φ
using the following concept. Define the correlation between two Boolean func-
tions f and g as
Corr(f, g) , Pr
x




Let us consider the quantity |Corr(xi, φ(Y1, Y2))|. With χS(Y1, Y2) ,∑




∣∣∣Corr(xi, χS(Y1, Y2))∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣Corr(xi, Y1 + Y2)∣∣∣




absolute values in the second term are each at most t. This is because for any
j ∈ [m], if |Corr(xi,C(x)j)| > t, then j1 is corrupted by B into a uniformly
random value in {0, 1}. Therefore, the correlation of the corrupted value with
xi is 0. This gives:∣∣∣Corr(xi, φ(Y1, Y2))∣∣∣ ≤ 2t+ ∣∣∣Corr(xi, Y1 + Y2)∣∣∣
For simplicity, let us temporarily just operate on |Corr(xi, Y1 + Y2)|:∣∣∣Corr(xi, Y1 + Y2)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Pr[xi = Y1 + Y2]− Pr[xi 6= Y1 + Y2]∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Pr[0 = xi + Y1 + Y2]− Pr[0 6= xi + Y1 + Y2]∣∣∣
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Because of the independence of x and B, we have:
=
∣∣∣Pr[0 = xi + C(x)1 + C(x)2] Pr[0 = B1 +B2]+
Pr[1 = xi + C(x)1 + C(x)2] Pr[1 = B1 +B2]−
Pr[0 = xi + C(x)1 + C(x)2] Pr[1 = B1 +B2]−
Pr[1 = xi + C(x)1 + C(x)2] Pr[0 = B1 +B2]
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣(Pr[0 = xi + C(x)1 + C(x)2]− Pr[1 = xi + C(x)1 + C(x)2])
(Pr[0 = B1 +B2]− Pr[1 = B1 +B2])
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Corr(xi,C(x)1 + C(x)2)Corr(0, B1 +B2)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣Corr(xi,C(x)1 + C(x)2)∣∣∣∣∣∣Corr(0, B1 +B2)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣Corr(0, B1 +B2)∣∣∣
Each member of B has been corrupted with probability at least β. By
Lemma 5.2.2, we know:
Pr
B
[|B ∩Q| = 1] ≥ 2β(1− β)− 4
γm
≥ 2β(1− β)− 8
m
Because β ≤ 1
2
, we have∣∣∣Corr(xi, φ(Y1, Y2))∣∣∣ ≤ 2t+ ((1− Pr
B






[|B ∩Q| = 1])
)




[|B ∩Q| = 1]
)






Noting that ErrQ,φ ≤ 12 or else the algorithm would just guess ran-
domly, we have:
(1− ErrQ,φ)− ErrQ,φ =
∣∣∣(1− ErrQ,φ)− ErrQ,φ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Corr(xi, φ(Y1, Y2))∣∣∣
⇒ ErrQ,φ ≥ 2β(1− β)− t−
8
m
Since for all Q and φ, ErrQ,φ ≥ 2β(1− β)− t− 8m , Prx,B[A
C(x)+B(1) 6=
x1] ≥ 2β(1−β)−t− 8m . Thus, there exists an x andB such that Pr[A
C(x)+B(1) 6=
x1] ≥ 2β(1 − β) − t − 8m , where the probability is only over the internal coin
flips of A.




). When β = δ−ν
γ
, first note that the
expression 2β(1−β) is strictly increasing in β. Therefore, we can lower bound
2β(1− β)− t− 8
m
evaluated at β = δ−ν
γ
with 2β̂(1− β̂)− t− 8
m
evaluated at









≥ 2δ(1− δ)− 2ν − t− 8
m
The lower bound of Katz and Trevisan [32] implies that m > n, for
large enough n. Therefore, this expression is more than 2δ(1− δ)− 2ν− t− 8
n
.
When β = 1
2






for large enough n (again,
note that m > n).
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Chapter 11
Locally Decodable Erasure Codes
11.1 Definitions and Properties
We will consider a variant of Locally Decodable Codes called Locally
Decodable Erasure Codes (LDECs). LDECs were first defined in Lu et al. [36]
and are similar to normal LDCs. Before defining LDECs here, we will make
a third definition that is conceptually halfway in between the definitions of
LDCs and LDECs. This will facilitate understanding of the similarities and
differences among all the models. This definition is based on the classic papers
Katz and Trevisan [32] and Goldreich et al. [24].
Definition 11.1 (See [32] and [24].) Define ∗ as an extra alphabet symbol
(to represent what are called erasures). For a natural number q and positive
reals δ and ζ, we say that C: Σn → Γm is a (q, δ, ζ)-PROBABILISTIC LO-
CALLY DECODABLE ERASURE CODE (Probabilistic LDEC) if there exists
a probabilistic oracle machine A such that:
• In every invocation, A makes at most q queries. Query j ∈ [m] to the
oracle y ∈ (Γ ∪ {∗})m is answered by yj. (Think of y as the partially
erased codeword that A is examining.)
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• For every i ∈ [n] and x ∈ Σn, we have Pr[AC(x)(i) = xi] = 1.
• For every i ∈ [n], x ∈ Σn, and y ∈ (Γ ∪ {∗})m, with y differing from
C(x) in at most δm locations all of which are ∗, the probability Ay(i)
does not query any ∗ positions is at least ζ.
The probabilities are taken over the internal coin tosses of A. A is called the
DECODING ALGORITHM.
Note that the functionality of A on a corrupted codeword is not de-
fined, strictly speaking.
Probabilistic LDECs are meant to be the analog of LDCs under the
erasure error model. Now here is a rephrasing of [36]’s original definition for
LDECs.
Definition 11.2 ([36].) For a natural number q and positive real δ, we say
that C: Σn → Γm is a (q, δ)-LOCALLY DECODABLE ERASURE CODE
(LDEC) if, for every S ⊂ [m] with |S| ≤ δm, there exists {j1, j2, ...jq} ⊂ [m]\S
and function f such that, for every x ∈ Σn, f(C(x)j1 ,C(x)j2 , ...C(x)jq) = xi.
Informally, an LDEC must support recovery of every input position
given only any 1− δ fraction of the codeword positions. Here is an equivalent
definition, based on the classic papers [32] and [24], showing how LDECs are
in some sense non-deterministic:
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Definition 11.3 ([36]. See also [32] and [24].) Define ∗ as an extra alphabet
symbol (to represent what are called erasures). For a natural number q and
positive real δ, we say that C: Σn → Γm is a (q, δ)-LOCALLY DECODABLE
ERASURE CODE (LDEC) if there exists a non-deterministic oracle machine
A such that:
• In every invocation, in each execution path, A makes at most q queries.
Query j ∈ [m] to the oracle y ∈ (Γ∪ {∗})m is answered by yj. (Think of
y as the partially erased codeword that is examining.)
• For every i ∈ [n] and x ∈ Σn, in each execution path, we have AC(x)(i)
= xi.
• For every i ∈ [n], x ∈ Σn, and y ∈ (Γ ∪ {∗})m, with y differing from
C(x) in at most δm locations all of which are ∗, there exists at least one
execution path of Ay(i) that does not query any ∗ locations.
A is called the DECODING ALGORITHM.
This definition illuminates that the essential difference between Prob-
abilistic LDECs and LDECs is that in the former case, A queries randomly
without prior knowledge of where the erasures are, but in the latter case, A
somehow knows where the erasures are and can avoid querying them.
Kerenidis and de Wolf [34] gives reductions for LDECs to and from
smooth codes, and [32] gives reductions for smooth codes to and from LDCs.
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Here are the reductions between LDECs and smooth codes:












Here we give two lemmas comparing Probabilistic LDECs with LDCs.
Lemma 11.3 Let C: Σn → Γm be a (q, δ, ζ)-Probabilistic LDEC. Then C is
also an (q, δ, ε)-LDC with 1|Σ| + ε ≥ ζ.
Proof: Because C is a Probabilistic LDEC, there exists an algorithm A such
that for every i ∈ [n] and S ⊂ [m] with |S| ≤ δm, the probability A queries
an edge intersecting S is less than or equal 1 − ζ. Let us now consider C as
an LDC, using the same decoding algorithm A. Because for every i ∈ [n] and
x ∈ Σn, we have Pr[AC(x)(i) = xi] = 1 (bullet point two of the definition of a
Probabilistic LDEC), A can only be wrong when it queries an edge containing
a vertex that has been corrupted. But this happens with no more than 1− ζ
probability.
Lemma 11.4 Let C be a (q, δ, ε)-LDC over field F whose recovery algorithm
is a linear decoder using exactly q positions. Define p , char(F ). Then C is
also an (q, δ, ζ)-Probabilistic LDEC with ζ ≥ εp
p−1 .
208
Note: Requiring a recovery algorithm to be a linear decoder that uses exactly
q positions is slightly more restrictive than bullet point 2 in the definition of
Probabilistic LDECs.
Proof: Let A be a linear decoder using exactly q positions and achieving
parameters (q, δ, ε) on C. We will show that, using A for C in the Probabilis-
tic LDEC model, we get correctness ζ ≥ εp
p−1 . We will prove the contrapositive.
Let ζ be the correctness A achieves in the Probabilistic LDEC model.
Assume ζ < εp
p−1 . This means there exists an i ∈ [n] and S ⊂ [m] with |S| ≤ δm
such that if the adversary erases the codeword positions indexed by members
of S, the probability A’s query set does not intersect S is ζ. Arbitrarily fix
x ∈ F n as the input to the code.
Now let us consider what happens in the LDC model. Have the ad-
versary corrupt the codeword by adding a uniformly random value of F inde-
pendently to each position indexed by a member of S. There are two cases
in which A returns the correct answer on this corrupted codeword: either its
randomly chosen query set does not intersect S or its randomly chosen query
set intersects S, but the appropriate linear combination of the random values
in the intersection (this is fixed as part of A) is 0. The probability A gets the
correct answer conditioned on this second case (the randomly chosen query set
intersects S) occurring is 1
p






















11.2 Correctness Bounds for Probabilistic LDECs
Just as with our results on LDCs, sometimes with the Probabilistic
LDEC model, we will want to emphasize that a proof about the adversary’s
capabilities holds for all input positions and not just one. To express that, we
define a technical variant of correctness:










Pr[Ay(i) does not query any ∗ positions]
)
where the probability is over the A’s internal randomness and the notation
maxA means the maximum over all probabilistic oracle machines A such that:
• In every invocation, A makes at most q queries. Query j ∈ [m] to the
oracle y ∈ (Γ ∪ {∗})m is answered by yj. (Think of y as the partially
erased codeword that A is examining.)
• For every i ∈ [n] and x ∈ Σn, we have Pr[AC(x)(i) = xi] = 1.
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It is obvious from the definitions that, for every (q, δ, ζ)-Probabilistic
LDEC, ζ ≤ ζ?. Here is a fact about the limitations of the performance capa-
bilities of Probabilistic LDECs.
Claim 11.5 For any Probabilistic LDEC recovery algorithm A using exactly
q positions, ζ?(A) < (1− δ)q.
Proof: The adversary chooses a set of δm positions uniformly at random
from [m]. The adversary erases these positions. For any given query set
the algorithm chooses to query, arbitrarily number the positions 1 to q. The
probability that the first position is not erased is m−δm
m
= 1−δ. The probability
that the k’th position queried (2 ≤ k ≤ q) is not erased conditioned that the
first k−1 positions were not erased is m−k+1−δm
m−k+1 < 1−δ. Multiplying these, we
find the probability the algorithm is correct with less than (1−δ)q probability.
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Chapter 12
Hadamard Codes Can Have Very Small Error
The prototypical example of an LDC is the Hadamard code. In partic-
ular, it is possible that, of all LDCs, the Hadamard code achieves the highest
ε given any δ (for a fixed q). In fact, we will prove that the Hadamard code
gives close to optimal correctness. In this chapter, we investigate the limits
of the Hadamard code’s performance. Here is the definition of the Hadamard
code:
Definition 12.1 Fix x1, x2, ...xn ∈ {0, 1} as an input. For each a ∈ {0, 1}n,
define the a’th position of the Hadamard code as Ca(x1...xn) = a · [x1...xn].
As a warmup, we consider the Hadamard code under two query recovery
algorithms. This lemma is well known, and it originates from the techniques
of Blum et al. [10].
Lemma 12.1 When the Hadamard code is used as a two query LDC, the
correctness is at least 1− 2δ.
Proof: Without loss of generality, let x1 be the input position requested.
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Define E as the following.{
{a, a+ e1} | a ∈ {0, 1}n
}
Define A as the algorithm that selects a member from E to query uni-
formly at random and sums the two bits it receives. Notice that E is a complete
matching over the ground set that is the set of positions in the Hadamard code.
So no two members of E intersect. Therefore, for any adversary, each vertex
the adversary corrupts can cause at most one edge in E to be recovered incor-
rectly. Clearly |E| = m
2




Claim 10.1 is very nearly a matching upper bound to this lemma.
Given larger q, we can achieve dramatically smaller error:
Theorem 12.2 For δ < 1
4








for the Hadamard code.
Note: We will actually prove the stronger, but slightly more complicated,
bound:








Proof: Let z be defined so that q = 2z. For clarity, call the algorithm used
in Claim 12.1 as Â. The algorithm will perform Â as a sub-procedure z times.
Each sub-procedure will use its own random coin flips, and hence each answer
produced by an Â will be independent from the other answers, conditioned on
the input to the code and the error. The algorithm will take the majority vote
of the z answers it receives. In the case that z is even and the vote is tied,
assume the algorithm guesses 0 or 1 with equal probability (1
2
). For any fixed
input to the code and error, let the probability, over the randomness of Â,
that the adversary makes one sub-procedure wrong be α. The majority vote
operation produces the wrong answer when half or more of the sub-procedures
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both equal 2z−1. Next, note that Lemma 12.1 shows α ≤ 2δ and, by
assumption, 2δ < 1
2
. Therefore, α
1−α < 1, and (1 − α)
iαz−i is increasing in i.














This expression is increasing in α, and α ≤ 2δ, so the result follows.
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Alternatively, in the last proof, we could have upper bounded the error































The region where this upper bound is tightest is near where δ = 1
4
. But
we are usually interested in δ close to 0, instead. So that is why we used the
a different upper bounding method in the theorem above.
The algorithm presented in the last theorem uses a majority vote op-
eration, so it is not a linear decoder. Any q query linear decoder would have
error at least qδ−o(δ), which is much worse than the algorithm in the last the-
orem. This shows linear decoders do not perform as well as other algorithms
when the number of queries gets large.
This construction should be contrasted with our upper bounds on cor-
rectness in Chapters 9 and 10. These results show that the Hadamard code
can indeed achieve close to optimal correctness.
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